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THE NEW CRIMINAL DISCOVERY CODE IN




In Allen v. District Court,' the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
devised a new system of criminal discovery to "fill the gaps that currently
exist within our statutory framework." 2 With only a summary discussion
of the reasons for doing so, the court fashioned new comprehensive guide-
lines governing pre-trial discovery in all state criminal cases.' These new
procedures, mandating broad disclosures by the prosecution and the defense,
reflect the Allen court's underlying assumption that pre-trial discovery should
be "a two-way street." By obligating defense counsel to provide extensive
discovery to the prosecution, however, Allen dramatically alters the role
and the responsibilities of counsel in the defense of a criminal case. Not
only does the Allen decision gloss over the constitutional implications of
compelling defendants to disclose pre-trial information, the decision also
completely ignores the impact of mandating such disclosures on certain
fundamental principles underlying the adversary system.
This article first examines criminal discovery in Oklahoma prior to the
Allen decision. Next, section II of the article explores Allen and the court's
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1. 803 P.2d 1164 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
2. Id. at 1167.
3. It is questionable, however, that the Allen procedures extend to misdemeanor cases.
See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
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justifications for creating a reciprocal discovery system. The article reviews
the Allen procedures and similar pre-trial discovery provisions contained in
the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice and ques-
tions whether Allen's new discovery system will achieve the desired results.
Section II also focuses on the constitutionality of the defendant's disclosure
obligations and the adverse effects of mandating such disclosures on the
adversary system. Finally, section III of the article proposes an alternative
discovery code based largely on the ABA Standards and argues that the
Oklahoma legislature should adopt such a code because it appropriately
balances the defendant's constitutional rights with the state's interest in a
fair, efficient system of pre-trial discovery.
I. Discovery in Oklahoma Before Allen
On June 15, 1990, Stephen Lee Allen was charged in Washington County
with the first degree murder of his wife, Sandra Jo Allen. A preliminary
hearing was scheduled to begin on August 13, 1990, before Judge Myrna
Lansdown. At the hearing, the prosecution would be required to introduce
sufficient evidence to convince Judge Lansdown that Allen should be bound
over for trial s.5 On August 2, 1990, Allen's attorney, Alan Carlson, filed an
extensive discovery motion requesting that the prosecutor be ordered to
provide the defense. reports, statements, records, and otfier information in
the prosecution's possession, before the preliminary hearing. 6 Carlson argued
that he needed access to test results, technical and physical evidence, and
the defendant's statements prior to the preliminary hearing in order to
enable him to represent his client effectively at the preliminary examination
and to protect Alen's right to a fair trial.7 Judge Landsdown denied
Carlson's motion, claiming that she was without authority to order discovery
before the preliminary hearing." Allen then took an interlocutory appeal to
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which in turn used the case as
4. STANDARDS FOR CRDMNAL JUSTICE 11-1.1 to 11-5.4 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS].
5. To bind a defendant over for trial, the judge must be satisfied that the state presented
sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to show that a crime had been committed and
that the defendant probably committed the crime. State v. Weese, 625 P.2d 118 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1981).
6. Carlson's nine-page motion detailed forty-nine specific requests covering all the infor-
mation and material likely to be found in the prosecution's file or in the possession of any
of the investigative agencies or experts working with the prosecution in this murder case. See
Response to Petitioner's Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition at exhibit 4, Allen v.
District Court, 803 P.2d 1164 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (No. 0-90-0825).
7. See Brief in Support of Petitioner's Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition at
13-14, Allen (No. 0-90-0825).
8. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1165. Stafford v. State and State v. Benson seemingly limited a
defendant's access to discovery material before the preliminary hearing to conviction records
of prospective witnesses. Stafford v. State, 595 P.2d 797 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); State v.
Benson, 661 P.2d 908 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Nonetheless, title 22, § 749 of the Oklahoma
Statutes also entitled a defendant to sworn witness statements "upon the same being obtained."
22 OKLA. STAT. § 749 (1981). If such statements were obtained before charges were filed, a
defendant should be provided copies before the preliminary hearing.
[Vol. 44:387
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a vehicle to issue a sweeping opinion setting forth the procedures governing
discovery in all Oklahoma criminal cases. 9 Before examining that decision,
it is necessary to review briefly the history of criminal discovery in Oklahoma
before Allen.
Although discovery in civil cases in Oklahoma is governed by a statutory
scheme modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 0 the Oklahoma
legislature has never adopted a comprehensive code of criminal discovery."
Thus, at the time of the Allen decision, there were very few statutory
provisions relating to discovery in criminal cases.
Since 1895, the prosecution has been obligated by statute to endorse the
names of the state's witnesses on the information, the charging document
filed in a criminal case.' 2 It was not until 1969, however, that a statute was
enacted requiring prosecutors to give defense counsel copies of any sworn
statements made to a peace officer or prosecutor by any person having
knowledge of the case.' 3 Nonetheless, that statute - title 22, section 749
- provided little real benefit to criminal defendants because the court
repeatedly refused to extend it to cover written or recorded statements of
witnesses.' 4 The state, therefore, could restrict defense counsel's access to
the prosecution's case simply by limiting its use of sworn statements.
Additionally, if the defendant had been indicted by a grand jury, defense
counsel was entitled to a copy of any relevant grand jury testimony.'5 Yet
9. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167-69.
10. 12 OKu.A. STAT. §§ 32243237 (1981).
11. There have been, however, numerous attempts to create a criminal discovery code in
Oklahoma. See Lee, The Need For a New Criminal Discovery Code in Oklahoma State Courts
Requiring Disclosure of Investigative Reports to Defendants, 60 OKLA. B.J. 2259 (1989).
Following Allen, House Bill 1755 and Senate Bill 396 were introduced, each proposing a
comprehensive criminal discovery statute with features similar to those created by Allen. Each
bill passed and was sent to a conference committee to reconcile the differences. The legislative
session ended in May 1991 without any bill being reported out of this committee. H.R. 1755,
43d Leg., Ist Sess.; S. 396, 43d Leg., 1st Sess.
12. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 303 (1981). This statute also requires the prosecutor to include the
witnesses last known addresses and to endorse additional witnesses as they become known.
The statute does not require the prosecutor to disclose all witnesses because rebuttal witnesses
need not be endorsed. Martin v. State, 596 P.2d 899, 901 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); Lavicky
v. State, 632 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); see also 22 OKLA. STAT. § 384 (1981)
(dating back to 1890, requiring the prosecutor to endorse names of witnesses on an indictment)
OKLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 20 (which gives a defendant in a capital case the right to a list of
witnesses to be called in the state's case-in-chief).
13. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 749 (1981).
14. State ex rel. Fallis v. Truesdell, 493 P.2d 1134, 1136-37 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972);
Farmer v. State, 565 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634,
641 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). In a recent post-Allen decision, the court reiterated its long-
standing position that unsworn statements of witnesses made to law enforcement officers need
not be disclosed. Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). Investigation
reports containing Brady material, however, must be disclosed to the defense. Amos v. District
Court, 814 P.2d 502 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). Moreover, under the new Allen guidelines, a
defendant is entitled to at least a summary of witnesses' oral statements and arguably the
investigative report itself. Id. at 2260.
15. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 340 (1981). The court refused to permit the state to deprive a
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the value of this statutory provision was limited, given the minimal use of
the grand jury in Oklahoma. Accordingly, Carlson had little statutory
authority to rely on to compel the Washington County prosecutors to divulge
information in their possession.
Carlson could point, however, to a series of Oklahoma and federal
decisions requiring prosecutors to turn over to the defense certain evidentiary
items. Although neither the prosecution nor the defense had any right to
discovery in a criminal case at common law,' 6 the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals -- and appellate courts across the county - began in the
1960s and 1970s to expand the criminal defendant's right to pre-trial dis-
covery. Much of this expansion followed in the wake of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland.'7 The Warren Court's
efforts to enhance the rights of the accused and the fairness of the criminal
process led many courts around the country, including the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals, to reject the notion of a criminal trial as a "game of
hide and seek" and to grant the defendant greater pre-trial access to the
prosecution's case.'8
In 1957, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in State ex rel. Sadler
v. Lackey,'9 first recognized that a trial court has the authority to compel
a prosecutor to provide a criminal defendant access to some of the state's
evidence. 20 In Lackey, the court initially reaffirmed the general proposition
that absent statutory authority, a defendant had no absolute right
of pre-trial inspection or to compel the state to produce docu-
defendant of the benefit of this statute by dismissing an indictment and instead filing an
information. English v. District Court, 492 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). In State
ex rel. Fallis v. Miracle, 494 P.2d 676, 677 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972), however, the court
declined to extend the statute or find any other basis for providing the defendants with
transcripts of witnesses who previously testified in front of a grand jury investigating the same
crime. Rather the court held that because the defendants were not indicted by the grand jury,
they were not "an accused" under the statute, and therefore, not entitled to the transcripts.
Id. at 677. But see Rush v. Blasdel, 840 P.2d 1140 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (overruling Miracle
and providing a defendant access to transcripts of a prior grand jury).
If a witness' grand jury testimony is materially inconsistent with that witness' later testimony
at a hearing or trial, the prosecutor clearly is obligated promptly to provide defense counsel
the grand jury transcript or notify counsel of the existence of the inconsistency. Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 2&, 269 (1959); Hall v. State, 650 P.2d 893, 897 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
16. State ex rel. Sadler v. Lackey, 319 P.2d 610, 613 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
17. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
18. See Wing v. State, 490 P.2d 1376, 1383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 919 (1972). For a summary of the arguments in favor of expanding the defendant's pre-
trial access to the prosecution's case, see Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event
or Quest for Truth?, 1953 WASH. L.Q. 229. Justice Brennan's influential article was relied on
by the drafters of the initial ABA Standards relating to discovery, published in 1970. ABA
PROJECT ON MINI1MI SrANDARDs FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DiscovERY
AND PROCEDURE BEORE TRIAL (1970). The article was also cited by Justice Marshall in Wardius
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473 (1973). For a discussion of Wardius, see infra notes 101-05 and
accompanying text.
19. 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
20. Id. at 613.
[Vol. 44:387
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ments and reports that may be beneficial to the defendant ...
[nor] an inherent right to examination of the state's evidence,
merely in the hope that something may turn up which would aid
his defense or supply clues for gathering evidence. 21
Nevertheless, the court went on to find that fair play demanded that the
prosecutor provide the defendant a copy of an FBI report analyzing paint
scrapings taken off the defendant's car which allegedly had been involved
in a fatal hit-and-run accident.? In carving out this exception to the general
ban on pre-trial inspection, the court emphasized the unfairness of forcing
the defendant to wait until the trial to learn if the paint scrapings indeed
did connect him with the accident. 23 Armed with the report, the defendant
might elect to waive a jury trial or even plead guilty. Without it, the
defendant's defense would be one of "speculation and surmise." 24
Three years later in Layman v. State,2 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals again faced the issue of whether a criminal defendant should have
pre-trial access to a technical report in the prosecution's possession. In
Layman, the defendants sought to inspect an engineer's report, the key
piece of evidence in a construction fraud case. Echoing its concern that the
state "not be permitted to draw one drop of blood through unfairness or
the medium of unjust surprise," the court ordered the prosecution to allow
the pre-trial inspection the defendants sought.26 The court stressed that
defense counsel needed the report in advance of trial to be able to conduct
an intelligent cross-examination. If counsel could not conduct an adequate
cross-examination, then the defendants may be denied their right to a fair
trial. 27 Additionally, permitting the pre-trial inspection of technical reports
served the court's interest in promoting orderly, expeditious trials. 2 The
court concluded, therefore, that even though a trial judge had broad dis-
cretion to grant or refuse the pre-trial inspection of technical reports, it was
an abuse of discretion not to provide pre-trial access to this report. 29
Thus, at the time Carlson made his discovery motion on behalf of Allen,
a criminal defendant generally obtained pre-trial access to technical and
21. Id.
22. Id. at 614-15.
23. Id. at 615. The court stressed that this was a "hardship case" where the report was
the defendant's only source of information and no useful purpose would be served by denying
inspection. It noted that in other cases where inspection would greatly hamper the prosecution,
however, inspection should be denied. Id.
24. Id.
25. 355 P.2d 444 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960).
26. Id. at 449. In addition to the report itself, the exhibits supporting the report, which
included motion pictures, photographs, charts, graphs, and computations, were also to be
produced for defense inspection. Id.
27. Id. at 448-49. Focusing on the technical nature of the report and its importance to the
state's case, the court concluded it would be unfair to permit the state to "ambush" the
defendant with the report leaving defense counsel time only for a cursory examination before
conducting cross-examination. Id.
28. Id. at 449.
29. Id. at 450-51.
1991]
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scientific reports within the prosecutor's possession or control. 30 It also .was
clear that a defendant had the right to a pre-trial inspection of the state's
physical evidence.3' Moreover, the prosecutor had to provide that inspection
in a timely manner, thereby affording the defendant a fair and meaningful
opportunity to conduct a competent, independent examination of the phys-
ical evidence . 2 In addition, *defense counsel was entitled to obtain before
trial a copy of the defendant's own written statement and a summary of
any oral statements the defendant made to law enforcement officers. 3
Finally, the court relied on the ABA Standards to impose on Oklahoma
prosecutors the duty to provide defendants the criminal records of the state's
witnesses.3 4
Neither the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals nor the United States
Supreme Court explicitly recognized a general constitutional right to dis-
covery. 35 Nonetheless, criminal defendants were granted access to various
aspects of the prosecution's case based on notions of fundamental fairness
and due process as well as judicial concerns about the orderly, efficient
administration of justice. Thus, in Moore v. State,36 the court stressed that
allowing defense counsel to review scientific results and reports before trial
was required by due process. Moreover, such pre-trial access reinforced the
defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses, to exercise the right
of compulsory process, and to enter a knowing and intelligent plea of
guilty. 37 The court employed similar reasoning in Burks v. State38 when it
30. See Layman, 355 P.2d at 447-51 (engineer's report); Hamm v. State, 516 P.2d 825
(Okla. Crim. App. 173) (ballistics report); Moore v. State, 740 P.2d 731, 735-36 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1987) (chemist's report); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)
(forensic report); Stafford v. District Court, 595 P.2d 797, 799 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979)
(autopsy report). But see Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (an
expert's report need not disclose all of her opinions).
31. McCarty, 765 P.2d at 1217 (hair samples); Stafford, 595 P.2d at 799 (fingerprints);
Moore, 740 P.2d at 735 (a sample of the alleged controlled substance); Doakes v. District
Court, 447 P.2d 461, 464 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968) (alleged death weapon); Melton v. State,
512 P.2d 204 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (alleged obscene film).
32. See McCarty, 765 P.2d at 1217. For a recent post-Allen decision reiterating that due
process and fundamental fairness require that an accused be afforded a fair and adequate
opportunity to make a competent independent pre-trial examination of physical evidence and
technical reports, see Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
33. See Doakes, 447 P.2d at 465 (defendant's written confession to be disclosed ); Watts
v. State, 487 P.2d 981, 986 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (state should reveal contents of defendant's
oral statement). But see Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634, 641 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Hollan
v. State, 676 P.2d 861, 864 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (restricting the oral statements which
needed to be disclosed to those made to law enforcement officers during a custodial interro-
gation).
34. Stevenson v. State, 486 P.2d 646, 650 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (citing with approval
ABA PROJECT ON MiNMum STANDARDs FOR CRnIMNAL JusTICE, STANDARDs RELATINO TO
DiscovERY AND PROCEDUiRE BEFORE TRIAL 2.1 (an earlier version of the present ABA STAN-
DARDS 11.2.1)), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972).
35. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (Court specifically noted that
there is no general constitutional right to discovery). Like many courts, however, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appetds held that due process required certain pre-trial disclosures be made
to the defendant. See, e.g., Moore, 740 P.2d at 735; McCarty, 765 P.2d at 1217.
36. 740 P.2d 731 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
37. Id. at 734-35.
38. 594 P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979), overruled, Jones v. State, 772 P.2d 922 (Okla.
[Vol. 44:387
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established guidelines requiring the prosecution to disclose, ten days before
the trial, the prosecutor's intent to use other crimhes' evidence. 39 The court
maintained that these new guidelines for the use of other crimes' evidence
would enhance judicial efficiency and would minimize trial error. It also
emphasized that such pre-trial notice comported with due process by giving
the defendant the opportunity to adequately prepare a defense and to
confront and cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses.40
Nevertheless, while declaring it was "committed to the concept of full
pre-trial discovery where reasonable and practical," ' 4' the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals steadfastly limited the defendant's access to other pre-
trial information which certainly would have enhanced the defendant's
ability to prepare a defense.4 2 The court broadly interpreted the "work-
product" doctrine so as to shield most police reports from the defense. 4
At times the court criticized the prosecution for its tardiness in complying
with pre-trial disclosures, which denied the defense the time to prepare,
consult experts, and effectively cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses. 4
38. 594 P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979), overruled, Jones v. State, 772 P.2d 922 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1982).
39. Id. at 775. Other crimes evidence is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or accident. 12 OVuA. STAT. §
2404 (Supp. 1987). The Burks notice requirement also has been extended to include "bad acts"
by the defendant. Freeman v. State, 767 P.2d 1354, 1357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
40. Burks, 594 P.2d at 776.
41. Wing v. State, 490 P.2d 1376, 1383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
42. In Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634, 641 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals held that the prosecutor did not err in withholding from the defense the
defendant's statements to his cellmate and to his probation officer despite the trial court's pre-
trial order that defendant's oral statements be disclosed. The court justified non-disclosure by
finding that the pre-trial order should have been understood only to cover statements to law
enforcement officers. Id. The court easily could have announced that to avoid confusion and
surprise and achieve other goals, including enhancing the defendant's ability to prepare a
defense, it was adopting ABA Standard 11-2.1(aXii) and requiring in the future that all
defendant's statements be disclosed prior to trial. Instead, the court noted only that defendant
had notice that his cellmate was a potential witness and "it was his responsibility to determine
what the substance of that testimony would be." Id. If the cellmate exercises his right and
refuses to be interviewed, however, the defense is not in a position to make any such
determination. Rather, the defense will have to proceed to trial with only speculation to go
on as to the cellmate's testimony. For other cases in which the court restricted defense access,
see Farmer v. State, 565 P.2d 1068 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (tape recorded statements of
witnesses); Hickerson v. State, 565 P.2d 684 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (police report containing
initial description of robber); Perez v. State, 614 P.2d 1112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (police
officer's notes of interview with defendant).
43. State ex rel. Fallis v. Truesdell, 493 P.2d 1134, 1136-37 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972);
Curtis v. State, 518 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Nauni v. State, 670 P.2d 126,
133 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Under Oklahoma law prior to Allen, therefore, police investigative
reports were not discoverable unless they contained Brady material. Van White v. State, 752
P.2d 814, 819 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). For a useful article criticizing the court's refusal to
require disclosure of police reports and urging the adoption of a discovery code compelling
open discovery of the prosecution's evidence, see Lee, supra note 11.
44. See supra note 32. See also Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1266 (Okla. Crim. App.
1990) where the court chastised the state for failing to provide hair samples to the defendant
1991]
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More often, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals vindicated a prose-
cutor's nondisclosure by characterizing the defense's discovery request as
too general or too speculative. 45 Xs a result, criminal defendants obtained
uneven, but usually limited, access to information because access depended
largely on the individual prosecutor's sense of fairness or unwillingness to
risk reversal for a failure to disclose.
Prior to :Allen, then, an Oklahoma prosecutor was obligated only to
disclose exculpatory evidence and certain specific items to the defense before
trial. There clearly was no obligation to make a complete and detailed
account to the defense of all police investigation done on a case." Further-
more, Stafford v. District Court5 7 clearly held that only the criminal records
of prospective witnesses need be disclosed prior to the preliminary exami-
nation.4" Hence, Carlson faced an uphill battle in his effort to convince the
court to overrule Stafford and provide discovery before the preliminary
hearing.
Carlson did convince Judge Lansdown that the prosecution was obligated
to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense as soon as that evidence
became known. 49 Unquestionably, due process required state prosecutors to
for examination, but concluded that the defense waived any error by proceeding to trial without
requesting a continuance.
45. See Bettyoun v. State, 562 P.2d 862, 866 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Stevenson v. State,
486 P.2d 646, 650 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Wing, 490 P.2d at 1383; Hall v. State, 751 P.2d
1091, 1093 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). Curtis v. State illustrates the problems facing the defendant
and the court when the prosecutor does not provide the defense pre-trial access to the state's
evidence. In Curtis, the defendant was denied a copy of his own fingerprints or a photo of a
fingerprint taken from an envelope found at the scene of the crime. The Oklahoma Criminal
Court of Appeals found no error because, on appeal, the defendant did not show that the
print was "other than how Agent Jones testified." Curtis v. State, 518 P.2d 1288, 1292 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1974). The agent had testified that he had been advised by a laboratory technician
shortly before taking the witness stand by telephone that no comparison could be made of the
print.
The court rightfully does not want to reverse a conviction only on the possibility that the
print may have been exculpatory. However, it is impossible without access to the print and
examination by a defense expert for the defendant to realistically challenge Agent Jones'
testimony and to make the requisite showing demanded by the court. The defendant should
not have had to accept at face value the agent's testimony but should have been provided
access to this evidence. Rather than point out that fairness and sound policy dictate giving
future defendants access to such evidence, the court simply focused on the defendant's inability
to prove the exculpatory nature of the evidence. The state should not be permitted to interfere
with the defendant's ability to mount a defense by the imposition of a requirement which the
state's own actions have rendered impossible to fulfill. Hilliard v. Spalding, 719 F.2d 1443,
1446-47 (9th Cir. 1983).
46. Winterhalder v. State, 728 P.2d 850, 852 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
47. 595 P.2d 797 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
48. Id. at 799. But see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
49. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1164. Although the opinion is not clear on this point, Judge
Lansdown seemingly required the disclosure of Brady material even before the preliminary
hearing. But see Stafford v. District Court, 595 P.2d 797, 799 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (Brady
material need not be turned over until after the preliminary examination).
[Vol. 44:387
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disclose to the defense favorable information and documents in the prose-
cution's possession or control, including prior inconsistent statements of
prosecution witnesses and any agreements made with those witnesses.50 In
addition to due process, most ethics codes, including the Oklahoma Rules
of Professional Conduct, mandate that prosecutors disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense.5 1
At the time of the Allen decision, however, no "bright-line" clearly
established what constituted timely disclosure. The ABA Standards and its
drafters urged prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence "at the earliest
feasible opportunity" and "to disclose all material that is even possibly
exculpatory. 52 Unfortunately, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
generally has maintained an unduly narrow view of the prosecutor's re-
sponsibility to disclose exculpatory evidence.53 Nevertheless, while disagree-
50. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). For examples of cases in which the
prosecutor's failure to disclose violated due process, see Binsz v. State, 675 P.2d 448 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1984) (due process violated when prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony
of defendant's accomplice which concealed a favorable plea bargain between the prosecutor
and the accomplice); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (due process violated when
prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony of a co-conspirator who denied being promised
anything for his testimony when in fact he had been granted immunity).
51. The prosecutor in a criminal case shall
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except
when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the
tribunal.
OKA IAnoA RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(d) (1988). This rule is identical to MODEL
RULEs OF PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULEs]. A similar
provision can be found in MODEL CODE OF PROFEssioNAL REsPONsmzrrY DR7-103 (1981).
52. ABA STANDARs 3-3.11, 3-62 commentary.
53. The court stated that "requiring the State either to determine or disclose information
which is arguably exculpatory, or which may become beneficial, or may lead to exculpatory
material, is neither within the spirit or letter of the Brady doctrine." Winterhalder v. State,
728 P.2d 850, 852 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). Many courts and commentators disagree; instead,
in keeping with the true spirit of Brady, urge prosecutors "to disclose all material that is even
possibly exculpatory as a prophylactic against reversible error and possible professional mis-
conduct." ABA STANDARDS 3-62, 11-28; see also infra note 94 and accompanying text.
For a case which highlights the Court of Criminal Appeals' narrow view of a prosecutor's
duty, see Bowen v. State, 715 P.2d 1093 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911
(1985). In Bowen the court held that the prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence about three
other suspects in a triple murder case was not violative of due process because there was
insufficient evidence to link these suspects to the rmurders when compared to the evidence
against the defendant. Id. at 1098. The court concluded, therefore, that the prosecutor was
not on notice of a duty to reveal the withheld information about other suspects. Id. at 1099.
The federal district judge granted a writ of habeas corpus, however, overturning the
defendant's conviction as a result of the state's failure to disclose. On appeal, in Bowen v.
Maynard, the court found that a specific oral request for all other suspects had been made to
which the prosecutor had responded by asserting there were none. Bowen v. Maynard, 799
F.2d 593, 610 (10th Cir. 1986) Thus, unlike the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the
Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that a specific request for exculpatory evidence had been
made. Id. at 611. Furthermore, in the Tenth Circuit's view, even if a specific request had not
1991]
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ment existed about the proper scope of Brady,54 there was little question
that Brady and itS progeny imposed a significant obligation on the prosecutor
to reveal to the defense information that an advocate often would not wish
to disclose.
The prosecutor, of course, is not simply an advocate. As an administrator
or minister of justice, the prosecutor's duty is to seek justice, not merely
to secure convictions. 55 The special role played by the prosecutor in our
adversary system was summarized eloquently by Justice Sutherland in Berger
v. United States:-'
[Tihe United States Attorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.17
been made, the withheld evidence in this case should have been disclosed given its clear
materiality. The undisclosed evidence concerning one suspect, Lee Crowe, would have enabled
the defense to challenge the eyewitness identifications and raise a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's involvement. Id. Further, this evidence "could have been used to uncover other
leads and defense theories and to discredit the police investigation of the murders." Id. at
612.
54. Compare Justice Fortas' broad view of a prosecutor's Brady obligation in Giles v.
Maryland, 383 U.S. 65 (1967), with the view expressed in Justice Harlan's dissent. In Fortas'
view, "[N]o respectable interest of the State is served by its concealment of information which
is material, generously conceived, to the case, including all possible defenses." Id. at 98 (Fortas,
J., concurring). To Harlan, however, the prosecutor's obligation was satisfied as long as the
prosecutor did not knowingly use or fail to correct false testimony which may have had an
effect on the trial's outcome. Id. at 116-18 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his
duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSMILITY
EC7-13 (1981); see also ABA STArDARDS 3-3.1 & commentary; OtAHO LA RuLES or PRoFEs-
sioNAL CoNDuCT Rule 3.81 comment. The National District Attorneys Association published a
set of standards in 1977 acknowledging that the prosecutor's duty to seek justice calls for a
different sort of advocacy. "The prosecutor cannot assume the same role vis-a-vis the state
that defense counsel assumes vis-a-vis the client ; he cannot concentrate solely on an adversary
role and adopt the degre of partisanship characteristic of attorneys in civil proceeding."
NAToNAL PaosEcuTo- STANDARDs 177 (National District Attorneys Association 1977) (citing
Frye v. State, 91 Okla. Crim. 326, 218 P.2d 643 (1950)).
56. 295 U.S. 78 (1935), overruled, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
57. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. See also McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1988) (urging Oklahoma prosecutors to heed Justice Douglas, who cited the same quote
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The criminal defense lawyer, however, is not a minister of justice. The
lawyer for a criminal defendant is obligated to be a zealous advocate, testing
the state's case even at the expense of truth.58 The role of the criminal
defense lawyer in our adversary system is fundamentally different than that
of the prosecutor.5 9 Unlike the prosecutor, the defense attorney has no
from Justice Sutherland while similarly describing the role of the prosecutor in Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); United States v. Peyro,
786 F.2d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 1986) (prosecutor's "special duty as the government's agent is not
to convict, but to secure justice.").
58. "The basic duty the lawyer for the accused owes to the administration of justice is to
serve as the accused's counselor and advocate with courage, devotion, and to the utmost of
his or her learning and ability and according to law." ABA STANDARDS 4-1.1. See also Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948) (right to counsel demands undivided allegiance
and service devoted solely to the interests of the client). There is no question that our adversary
system requires the defense lawyer to be a zealous advocate pursuing the client's best interests.
See M. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAwYEas' ETmcs 65-73 (1990). As Charles Wolfram notes
in his authoritative text on legal ethics, "the American lawyer's professional model is that of
zeal: a lawyer is expected to devote energy, intelligence, skill and personal commitment to the
single goal of furthering the clients' interests as those are ultimately defined by the client."
C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETcs 585 (1986). Even those who argue that there ought to
be moral limits on a lawyer's zeal, generally acknowledge that the criminal defense lawyer
zealously must purse the defendant's interests even at the expense of an accurate outcome. D.
LUBAN, LAwYERS AND JusTIca: AN ETmCAL STuDY 58-63 (1988). As a zealous advocate,
defense counsel indeed may be legitimately frustrating the truth. See M. FREEDMAN, supra, at
161-71. Justice White summarized defense counsel's role and contrasted it with the prosecutor's
role:
But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the
truth. Our system assigns him a different mission .... Defense counsel need
present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish any
witnesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any
other information to help the prosecution's case. If he can confuse a witness,
even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive,
that will be his normal course. Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits
counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the worst possible
light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there
are some limits which defense counsel must observe, but more often than not,
defense counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he
can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will attempt to
destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. In this respect, as part of our modified
adversary system and as part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense
counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in many instances has little,
if any, relation to the search for truth.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part).
59. The two sides of the contest are not governed by the same rules, for the interest
of the prosecution is not that it shall win the case, but that it shall bring forth
the true facts surrounding the commission of the crime so that justice shall be
done; whereas the role of defense counsel is not only to prevent the conviction
of the innocent, but to represent his client diligently and skillfully, whether he
is innocent or guilty, using all legitimate forensic means to obtain an acquittal.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
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ethical responsibility to reveal unfavorable evidence to the other side. 60
Rather, the ethics codes enshrine the principle of partisanship and demand
that defense counsel maintain the client's confidences and function as a
zealous advocate regardless of the client's guilt or innocence.61 Unlike the
prosecutor, defense counsel actually may be frustrating truth while pursuing
a vigorous but ethical defense.62
introduction at 3 (Approved Draft 1972); see also supra note 55; M. FREEDMAN, supra note
58, at 213-15.
60. Espousing the principles of zealous partisanship, the ethics code generally permits a
criminal defense lawyer to withhold information or even create a misleading impression. For
a discussion of the limited extent to which the ethics codes restrain defense counsel's zealous
advocacy, see C. WoniAm, supra note 58, at 588-89, 641, 650-51; A. AmssmTAm, TRIAL
MANUAL FOR THE DEFEN!E OF CwmiNAL CAsas 2-327 (1984); M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S EnmCS
iN AN AVDvESAY SYsrEI 79-80 (1975). In a limited number of situations, courts have found
that a criminal defense lawyer, as an officer of the court, must divulge to the court adverse
information regarding a client. J. BunRKoF, Criminal Defense Ethics 6-49 to 6-60 (1986). See,
e.g., Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218, 220-21 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (critical information
regarding a client's competency must be disclosed); Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 Pa. 112,
511 A.2d 1327, 1333-17 (1986) (requiring disclosure of client's whereabouts). Other courts have
been wary of obligating defense counsel to temper her advocacy because of any duty as an
officer of the court. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d
Cir. 1977) (lawyer may not volunteer unsubstantiated opinion that client is committing perjury).
For a brief look at the widely diverging views of a defense lawyer's responsibilities as an
officer of the court, compare Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (Chief Justice Burger's
view emphasizing defense counsel's role as an officer of the court) with Jones v. Barnes, 463
U.S. 745, 761-62 (19113) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (view of Justice Brennan in stressing that
counsel must function a. an advocate as opposed to a friend of the court). See also United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (defense lawyer's mission not to ascertain or present the truth); Von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948) (Justice Black's view that right to counsel demands undivided
allegiance and service devoted solely to the interests of the client); Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (Justice Powell's view that defense counsel best serves the public by
advancing the individual interests of the accused); COMM'N ON PROF. RESp. OF THE RosCOE
PouD-AmERiCAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUND., THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT
preamble (1982) ("It is clear that the lawyer for a private party is and should be an officer
of the court only in the sense of serving a court as a zealous, partisan advocate of one side
of the case before it, and in the sense of having been licensed by a court to play that very
role.").
Defense counsel generally does have an ethical duty, however, to turn over physical evidence,
albeit unfavorable to the defendant, if the defense takes possession of that evidence. See infra
note 198 and accompanying text. Defense counsel has no duty to disclose but rather has a
duty to refuse to divulgI privileged information about the location of physical evidence as
long as the defense does not take possession of that evidence. Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d
1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
61. See supra notes 58, 60. See also State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim. 94, 130
P. 962 (1913) (by statute and settled common law, lawyer has duty to maintain client's
confidence and preserve client's secrets).
62. "The procedural and legal system are supposedly designed to produce results based on
just laws fairly applied on the basis of accurate facts; but a lawyer's objective within that
system is to achieve a retult favorable to the lawyer's client, possibly despite justice, the law,
and the facts." C. WOLFRAM, supra note 58, at 585. As David Mellinkoff observes,
[A] substantial part of the major criticism of the lawyer-his presumed indiffer-
ence to truth-is rooted in fundamental misconception of the lawyer's mission.
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In addition to the ethics codes, constitutional principles mandate that
defense counsel's role and responsibilities be different. As will be explored
more fully in the next section, the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
and the due process clause, which imposes the burden of proof on the state
while affording the defendant the presumption of innocence, all combine
to shape the defense lawyer's role. 63 Thus, there is no corresponding duty
similar to that set forth in Brady requiring defense counsel to disclose
inculpatory evidence because the due process clause protects individuals, not
the state.64
It is not surprising, therefore, that at the time of the Allen decision,
defense counsel in Oklahoma had only a very limited obligation to disclose
any information to the prosecution prior to trial. In fact, the prosecution
had only a statutory right to receive notice, pursuant to title 22, section 585,
of an alibi defense and notice of a mental illness or insanity defense, pursuant
to title 22, section 1176.65 Although both statutes call for notice to the
prosecutor, neither requires defense counsel to identify witnesses in support
of the defense or provide any additional documentation to the prosecutor.6
Other than providing notice of these specific defenses, defense counsel in
Oklahoma at the time of Allen did not have any obligation to provide the
prosecutor any details or information about the defendant's case. 67 Further-
more, there were no reported decisions in Oklahoma authorizing a trial court
to grant additional discovery to a prosecutor.6s
The lawyer does not exist to spread the word of truth and goodness to the ends
of the earth. Somewhat more limited, the lawyer's mission is the nonetheless
awesome task of trying to make a realty of equality before the law.
D. MELLiNKoFF, Tim CoNscrENCE OF A LAWYER 272 (1973). See also supra note 58. For
examples of cases in which defense counsel's efforts may frustrate truth or efficiency, see State
v. Brown, 644 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (a lawyer may seek to cast blame
on a co-defendant regardless of the lawyer's personal belief in the co-defendant's guilt); People
v. White, 57 N.Y.2d 129, 440 N.E.2d 1310, 454 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1982) (defense counsel has no
duty to produce alibi witness even though earlier revelation would have benefitted the efficient
administration of justice).
63. See infra notes 108-37, 142-62 and accompanying text.
64. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part); see also Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger,
J., dissenting), cited with approval in Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109 (D.C. 1979).
65. See 22 OKLA. STAT. §§ 585, 1176 (1981).
66. Defense counsel is not even obligated under title 22, § 585 of the Oklahoma Statutes
to file an alibi notice. The statute merely gives the prosecutor the right to ask for a continuance
to investigate an alibi defense where it is raised at trial without prior notice. Connery v. State,
499 P.2d 462 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); see also infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
67. In Brecheen v. Dycus ax rel. Court of Rec., Okla. City, 547 P.2d 980 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1976), the court rejected municipal court rules which mandated, among other require-
ments, that the defense make known to the prosecutor all evidence intended to be introduced
at trial. The court held that such disclosure requirements violate the fifth amendment, as well
as title 22, § 15 of the Oklahoma Statutes and article 2, § 21 of the state constitution. Id. at
982 (citing 22 OxiA. STAT. § 15 (1971); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 21).
68. See Mills v. Tulsa County Dist. Court, 770 P.2d 900, 901 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989)
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II. The Allen Decision: Oklahoma's New Criminal Discovery Code
What is surprising about the Allen decision is the Oklahoma Criminal
Court of Appeals' willingness to reach out to utilize this case to draft a
new criminal discovery code for Oklahoma. The judicial branch usually is
reluctant to engage in such sweeping reform, especially when the case before
the court can be disposed of easily in light of settled precedent. 9 While the
adoption of the new discovery procedures may not have violated the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine 7 0 there is no question that the legislative branch
is better-suited to engage in such extensive rule making. 7' Judicial restraint
is particularly appropriate when the issue of mandating broad defense
disclosures under the guise of reciprocal discovery - the cornerstone of the
(court rejected the state's attempt to secure a criminal defendant's psychiatric records before
trial concluding that ther., was no statutory authority allowing for such pre-trial discovery).
69. See Roberson v. State, 91 Okla. Crim. App. 217, 218 P.2d 414, 423 (1950) ("It is not
our place to legislate but to interpret. If the legislature finds the rule of evidence herein
involved out-moded as a vehicle of justice they may change the same by laying down a new
and different rule."); Re:3cue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947)
(discussing judicial restraint and the policies behind the doctrine); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HLv. L. Rav. 1 (1959).
70. Article 4, § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution states:
The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided into
three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial and except
as provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial depart-
ments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the
powers properly belonging to either of the others.
OKLA. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
The separation of powers doctrine as embodied in article 4, § I reflects the American
constitutional scheme that governmental powers must be shared by three separate but co-equal
branches with interdependent as well as independent responsibilities. Sterling Ref. Co. v.
Walker, 165 Okla. 45, 25 P.2d 312, 318 (1933); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989). There is no doubt that the legislative branch has the power to regulate the practice
and procedures of the courts. Walker, 25 P.2d at 318; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364. Moreover,
the legislative has the power to delegate rule making authority to the judicial branch. Sibbach
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. I (upholding the congressional grant of power to the judiciary to
promulgate the federal rules of civil procedure), reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 715 (1941). There is
a serious question, however, absent any delegation of power by the legislature, whether the
judiciary has the power to adopt broad discovery rules with substantive and political impli-
cations when that task s;:emingly would be more appropriately addressed by the legislative
branch. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385. A full
discussion of the separation of powers issue is beyond the scope of this article.
71. As the California Supreme Court observed in declining to uphold a trial court's order
compelling production of defense evidence, the issue of prosecutorial discovery is more appro-
priately left to the legislature for initial consideration because of the "primacy of the Legislature
in the field of creating rules of criminal procedure." People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 54, 634
P.2d 534, 540, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981). In addition, once the legislature adopts a compre-
hensive solution, it will be the court's task to review that legislation to ensure that it meets
constitutional muster. "As the heirs of that institutional obligation, we must be reluctant to
step out of our traditional role by undertaking to define in the first instance procedures that
upon reflection may appear to undermine the foundational principles it is our primary re-
sponsibility to protect." Id., 634 P.2d at 541.
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decision - barely was mentioned by the parties in their briefs.7 2 The court
was deprived, therefore, of a full discussion of the problems and issues
involving criminal discovery and of the insights which other interested parties
may have contributed had these issues fully been briefed and argued.73
In his brief, the defendant urged the court to overrule Stafford and
accelerate the defendant's access to information, especially scientific and
technical reports, which the defendant needed to challenge the state's evi-
dence at the preliminary hearing and later at trial. 74 The state's response
focused on the extent to which defense lawyers were subverting the "true
purpose" of preliminary examinations and turning these hearings into prac-
tice trials.7s The prosecution suggested that the court re-evaluate its holding
in Beaird v. Ramey 6 and restrict the scope of the preliminary hearing.
The court instead saw a "pressing need" to draft a new set of procedural
rules which would "expedite the trial of criminal cases and ... help alleviate
the pressing problem of pre-trial disclosure.""7 The opinion offers no ex-
planation as to what these pressing problems are or why the need is so
pressing, other than a brief reference to the fact that the court continually
confronts appellate cases regarding compliance with pre-trial discovery.78
There is no basis for expecting, however, that the new Allen procedures
will reduce the amount of appellate litigation involving pre-trial discovery
issues. Rather, unresolved procedural questions and serious constitutional
problems with the new procedures undoubtedly will spawn increased liti-
gation.
72. Although the defendant's two briefs argue at length for liberalizing discovery for the
defendant, it contains only a limited argument against reciprocity. Supplemental Brief in
Support of Petitioner's Writ Concerning Discovery at 16, Allen v. District Court, 803 P.2d
1164 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (No. 0-90-0825). The state's brief merely notes that if discovery
is to be changed, fairness dictates that it should be a "two-way street" with both sides given
access to information. Response to Petitioner's Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition
at 3, Allen (No. 0-90-0825).
73. Both the Oklahoma District Attorneys' Association and the Oklahoma Criminal Defense
Lawyers' Association surely would have filed amicus briefs as they did, for example, in Burks
v. State, 594 P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
74. See Brief in Support of Petitioner's Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition at
13-14, Allen (No. 0-90-0825).
75. See Response to Petitioner's Writ of Mandamus and/or Writ of Prohibition at 9, Allen
(No. 0-90-0825).
76. 456 P.2d 587 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
77. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167. In fact, a review of recent cases suggests that the primary
discovery problems confronting the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals involve prosecutorial
non-compliance or tardy compliance with discovery orders and prosecutorial non-disclosure of
possible exculpatory material. See, e.g., McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215 (Okla. Crim. App.
1988); Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317
(Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). Compelling
Oklahoma prosecutors to maintain an open file policy will minimize needless litigation as long
as meaningful sanctions are applied if prosecutors do not satisfy their disclosure obligations.
See infra notes 82-85, 221-28 and accompanying text. The recent cases do not demonstrate,
however, that there is any need for expanded defense disclosures.
78. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
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The court in Allen states that it drew upon, but chose not to adopt, the
ABA Standards in determining the appropriate pre-trial discovery procedures
for Oklahoma. 79 Once again, the absence of any discussion makes it im-
possible to ascertain the court's rationale for deviating from the ABA
Standards. Presumably, the court decided that its goals of expediting crim-
inal trials and alleviating the unarticulated pressing problem of pre-trial
disclosure would be best achieved by its modified version of the ABA
Standards. Nonetheless, by adopting only certain provisions of the ABA
Standards, the court ignored the drafters' warning that the Standards were
designed as an integrated whole to be adopted in their entirety. 0 As a result,
the Allen procedures have some serious gaps which require further clarifi-
cation. Before examining these gaps, a review of the disclosures mandated
by Allen is warranted.
Allen requires that the prosecution, upon the defendant's request, disclose
all of the material and information within the prosecutor's possession or
control, including but not limited to:
(a) the names and addresses of witnesses, together with their
relevant oral, written or recorded statement, or summaries of
same;
(b) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any
oral statements made by the accused or made by a co-defendant;
(c) any reports or statements made by experts in connection with
the particular case, including results of physical or mental ex-
aminations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons;
(d) any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects,
buildings, or places which the prosecuting attorney intends to use
in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or belong to
the accused;
(e) any record of prior criminal convictions of the defendant, or
of any codefendant; and
(f) OSBI or FBI rap sheet/records check on any witness listed
by the State or the defense as a possible witness who will testify
at trial."
The adoption of this language, which substantially tracks ABA Standard
11-2.1(a), represents a significant shift in the attitude of the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals toward discovery. Instead of limiting the pros-
ecutor's duty to disclose only to certain specified material, the Allen decision
now requires the prosecutor to adopt what essentially is an open file policy.a2
79. Id. The court stated that it also looked to other authorities, including the Model Penal
Code, for guidance. The Model Penal Code, however, does not contain any provisions relating
to pre-trial discovery.
80. See ABA STANDARDS 11-6.
81. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167-68.
82. In choosing to follow the approach spelled out in ABA STANDARDS 11-2.1 (a), the
Allen court apparently was persuaded, as was the ABA, that the open file concept promotes
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The enumerated items constitute the information which routinely will be
turned over to the defense, but the listed items are only illustrative, not
exhaustive. 3
By mandating even broader prosecutorial disclosures than recognized
under prior Oklahoma law, the court presumably agrees with the drafters
of the ABA Standards that this open file policy indeed will expedite the
handling of cases while minimizing the need for judicial supervision of
routine discovery. Moreover, providing the defense more information should
allow defense counsel to plea bargain more intelligently and exercise the
rights of confrontation and compulsory process more effectively. 4 Above
all, the open file approach is essential if the criminal justice system is going
to begin to make meaningful the indigent defendant's rights to effective
assistance of counsel. Without easy pre-trial access to the prosecution's case,
few defense lawyers can conduct an adequate investigation or be prepared
to do more than a cursory cross-examination of the state's witnesses.
Enhanced access should improve the quality of representation provided many
criminal defendants as well as reduce the number of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. 5
The Allen court's enumerated list mirrors ABA Standard 11-2.1(a) with
only minor variations. Allen appropriately tracks Standard 11-2.1(a)(iv) and
requires disclosure of all reports and statements of experts, not just those
the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial. Allen does not indlude ABA
Standard 11-2. 1(a)(iii) relating to grand jury minutes because title 22, section
340 already makes grand jury transcripts available to the defendant.16 Allen
many systemic goals at little to no cost to the state's ability to secure convictions. In the
exceptional case where pre-trial disclosure is problematic, the state may seek a protective order.
For a further discussion of the advantages of the open file concept, see ABA STANDARDSI 1-
16 to 11-18.
83. Id. 11-15.
84. Id. 11-17 to 11-18. The court previously relied on this commentary in holding that a
defendant was entitled to lab results and reports pertaining to the alleged controlled substance
he was charged with possessing. Moore v. State, 740 P.2d 731, 735 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987);
see also Clennon, Pre-Trial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to Improve the
Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 38
CATH. U.L. REv. 641 (1989) (arguing that providing the defendant greater opportunity to
discover state's case leads to better informed pleas without any appreciable loss to the state
in its ability to secure convictions).
85. There certainly are a number of able criminal defense lawyers who provide excellent
representation. Nonetheless, commentators overwhelmingly agree that many criminal defendants
are represented by overworked, inexperienced, and underpaid public defenders or appointed
lawyers who lack the investigative resources, expert services and time to function as competent,
zealous advocates. See D. LuBAN, supra note 58, at 60-61; A. BLmBERG, CRIINAL JUSrICE
(1967); Monahan, Who is Trying to Kill the Sixth Amendment?, CfuM. JusT., Summer 1991,
at 24. For an overview of the gap between the adversarial rhetoric of Gideon v. Wainwright,
407 U.S. 25 (1972), and the reality of indigent defense, see McConville & Mirsky, Criminal
Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 652-63 (1986-87).
See also infra notes 160-62, 167, 180-83 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 15.
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wisely requires disclosure of OSBI or FBI rap sheets/record checks, which
are discretionary items under the ABA Standards.87 Furthermore, Allen
explicitly states that all oral statements of witnesses or summaries of these
statements need to be disclosed, presumably to signal a clear departure from
prior Oklahoma law. 8 Finally, Allen follows the ABA recommendation that
all statements of the accused and any codefendants be disclosed. 9 This also
represents a deviation from prior law in that now a defendant's statements
to third parties and non-custodial statements must be disclosed9 This
"bright-line" rule should allow for more timely severance motions and a
more orderly pre..trial resolution of questions regarding the admissibility of
defendants' statements. 91
Allen also contains a provision, using language identical to that in ABA
Standard 11-2.1(c), which requires the prosecutor to disclose any exculpatory
material.9 As Allen acknowledges by not conditioning this disclosure on
the defendant's request, a prosecutor is obligated to disclose evidence which
is clearly exculpatory even where the defense has not made a specific
request. 93 Competent defense counsel should make as specific and detailed
a request for exculpatory evidence as possible.Y Although a prosecutor may
87. OSBI refers to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, the local counterpart to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See ABA STANDARDS 11-2.5 & commentary (rationale for
not making such reoDrds automatically available in every case). The Allen approach saves
judicial time, eliminates needless motions and forces the prosecutor routinely to obtain records
of all witnesses. This should eliminate, or at least minimize, cases such as Housley v. State,
785 P.2d 315 (Okla. Crm. App. 1989) (conviction reversed because state failed to disclose
criminal records of state witnesses).
88. For a discussion of prior Oklahoma law, see supra notes 14, 43 and accompanying
text. Pre-trial disclosure of witness statements decreases the need for repeated trial recesses,
minimizes ineffective cross-examination and improves trial preparation. See ABA STANDARDS
11-75. Moreover, the Allen provision enhances the defendant's ability to mount a defense by
requiring the prosecutor to disclose statements of all persons known to the prosecution to have
knowledge of the facts relevant to the defendant's case not just witnesses intended to be called
at trial.
89. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
90. ABA STANDmms l1-2.1(A)(iii) & commentary; see also supra note 33.
91. ABA STmNDims 11-20.
92. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168. "The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense counsel
any material or information within the prosecutor's possession or control which tends to negate
the guilt of the accused a; to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment
of the accused." Id. Tho language mirrors the Brady definition of exculpatory evidence.
93. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985); Bowen v. Mamard, 799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986);
see also ABA STANDARD.; 11-27 to 11-28. The prosecutor's duty as defined in the ethical rules
cited in supra note 51 al~o does not turn on a defense request.
94. The problem, of course, is that when defense counsel is unaware of the existence of
certain evidence it is oftcn impossible to make any sort of specific request. As Justice Fortas
observed, "[I]f the defense does not know of the existence of the evidence, it may not be able
to request its production." Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 102 (1966) (Fortas, J., concurring).
See also Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1340-44 (10th Cir. 1984) (discussing the difficulty
of formulating a specific Brady request and holding that a request for statements of witnesses
interviewed by any gove'nmental agency in connection with the case was specific enough to
give the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense required).
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be unsure of the exculpatory nature of certain material, "the prudent
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." 95
The final paragraph in Allen, outlining the prosecutor's disclosure obli-
gations, extends the prosecutor's disclosure responsibility to material and
information in the possession and control of the prosecutor's staff or of
those who regularly report, or in the particular case, reported to the
prosecutor's office.9 This language differs slightly from that in ABA Stan-
dard 11-2.1(d) in that it seemingly does not extend the prosecutor's obli-
gation to cover an investigative entity who may have participated in some
aspect of the case without reporting to the prosecutor.9 The court's rationale
for this modification is unclear.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' first major departure from
the ABA Standards occurs in Allen when the court examines the defendant's
disclosure obligations. According to Allen, a defendant shall be required to
disclose:
1. (a) The names and addresses of witnesses, together with their
relevant oral, written or recorded statement, or summaries of
same;
(b) the name and address of any witness, other than the
defendant, who will be called to show that the defendant was
not present at the time and place specified in the information [or
indictment], together with the witnesses statement to that fact;
(c) the names and addresses of any witness the defendant will
call, other than himself, for testimony relating to any mental
disease, mental defect, or other condition bearing upon his mental
state at the time the offense was allegedly committed, together
with the witnesses statement of that fact, if the statement is
95. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108. See also ABA STANDARDS 3-3.11 & commentary (urging
prosecutors to disclose all material that is even possibly exculpatory and reporting that many
experienced prosecutors habitually make most if not all evidence available to the defense).
Nonetheless, prosecutorial withholding of potentially exculpatory material remains a serious
systemic problem. See Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for BRADY Viola-
tions: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C.L. Rnv. 693, 694 (1987).
96. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
97. Standard 11-2.1(d) reads:
The prosecuting attorney's obligations under this standard extend to material and
information in the possession or control of members of the prosecutor's staff
and of any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the
case and who either regularly report or, with reference to the particular case,
have reported to the prosecutor's office.
ABA STANDARDs 11-2.1(d). The italicized portion was left out of the Allen definition. Even
without this clause, a prosecutor under Allen is still responsible for disclosing all relevant
material in the possession of any law enforcement office or government agency which dealt
with the prosecution with respect to a particular case. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Smith
v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1985); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.
1964); Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984) ("a prosecutor's office cannot
get around Brady by keeping itself in ignorance, or compartmentalizing information about
different aspects of a case").
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redacted by the court to preclude disclosure of privileged com-
munication ....
2. Upon the prosecuting attorney's request after the time set by
the court, the defendant shall allow him access at any reasonable
times and in any reasonable manner to inspect, photograph, copy,
or have reasonable tests made upon any book, paper, document,
photograph, or tangible object which is within the defendant's
possession or control and which:
(a) the defendant intends to offer in evidence, except to the
extent that it contains any communication of the defendant; or
(b) is a report or statement as to a physical or mental exami-
nation or scientific test or experiment made in connection with
the particular case prepared by and relating to the anticipated
testimony of a person whom the defendant intends to call as a
witness, provided the report or statement is redacted by the court
to preclude disclosure of privileged communication.98
Unlike the ABA Standards, the Allen court does not condition these
disclosure obligations upon a prior defense request followed by a request
by the prosecutor.9 Rather, the language "defense shall be required to
disclose" implies an affirmative duty to disclose the items identified in
paragraphs l(a), (b), and (c) even absent a request or court order. Appar-
ently, reports, statements, or intended evidence need only be disclosed if
specifically requested by the prosecutor.
The Allen decision offers little justification for the court's dramatic expan-
sion of a criminal defendant's obligation to divulge information to the state.
Rather, the court simply concludes that the proper administration of justice
necessitates the adoption of meaningful pre-trial discovery for each party in
a criminal case.' ® This conclusion is based on a cursory, unhelpful discussion
of three United States Supreme Court decisions: Wardius v. Oregon,'10 Wil-
liams v. Florida,1'  and Taylor v. Illinois.10u The Allen court quotes Justice
98. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
99. See ABA SmimDA.Rns 11-2.1 & commentary.
100. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
101. 412 U.S. 470 (1973). The trial court denied the defendant an opportunity to present
alibi witnesses or offer his own alibi testimony because of his failure to file a notice of alibi
pursuant to an Oregon statute. Since the statute did not grant reciprocal rights to defendant,
defendant's right to due process was violated by enforcing a facially invalid statute. Id. at
472.
102. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The defendant claimed that his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was violated when he was compelled by Florida's notice-of-alibi statute to
furnish the names of his alibi witnesses or suffer the exclusion of his alibi evidence. The Court
rejected this claim holding that requiring pre-trial discovery of alibi witnesses did not constitute
compulsion within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 86.
103. 484 U.S. 400 (1988). The Court found that the compulsory clause of the sixth amend-
ment did not constitute an absolute bar to the preclusion of a defense witness as a sanction
for violating an Illinois notice-of-alibi statute requiring the pre-trial identification of alibi
witnesses. Id. at 409. Preclusion was an appropriate sanction in light of defense counsel's
blatant and willful violation of the rule. Id. at 416.
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Marshall in Wardius to the effect that discovery must be a two-way street.1°4
Wardius provides little guidance, however, as to how far that street can extend
and still be within constitutional limits. The actual holding in Wardius, striking
down Oregon's notice-of-alibi statute on due process grounds because it made
no provision for reciprocal disclosures to the defendant, certainly does not
support the sweeping proposition that all defense-ordered disclosures are
constitutional as long as the prosecution has similar disclosure obligations. 105
Similarly, neither Williams nor Taylor offers much insight into the con-
stitutionality of granting the prosecution broad pre-trial access to the de-
fendant's case. It is true that both decisions contain language applauding
the growth of pre-trial discovery for each party in a criminal case. Yet the
holding in each case is quite narrow. Despite Justice Black's powerful
dissent, Williams does demonstrate that not all defense-ordered pre-trial
disclosures offend the fifth amendment. 1 6 And Taylor shows that precluding
104. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
105. Whatever discovery rights are provided the defense, the prosecution's rights will be
limited given the defendant's constitutional protections. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S.
10, 22 (1980). In fact, in a footnote to the exact language relied on by Allen, Justice Marshall
observed, "[I]ndeed, the State's inherent information-gathering advantages suggest that if there
is to be any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in the defendant's favor." Wardius,
412 U.S. at 475 n.9.
106. According to Justice Black, the Williams decision was a "radical and dangerous
departure from the historical and constitutionally guaranteed right of a defendant in a criminal
case to remain completely silent, requiring the State to prove its case without any assistance
of any kind from the defendant himself." Williams, 399 U.S. at 108 (Black, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
To Black, all compelled pre-trial discovery from the defense violates the fundamental
principles underlying the fifth amendment. Id. at 109-14. In Black's view, White's reading of
the fifth amendment unduly compromised the privilege against self-incrimination.
This constitutional right to remain absolutely silent cannot be avoided by super-
ficially attractive analogies to any so-called "compulsion" inherent in the trial
itself that may lead a defendant to put on evidence in his own defense. Obviously
the Constitution contemplates that a defendant can be "compelled" to stand
trial, and obviously there will be times when the trial process itself will require
the defendant to do something in order to try to avoid a conviction. But nothing
in the Constitution permits the State to add to the natural consequences of a
trial and compel the defendant in advance of trial to participate in any way in
the State's attempt to condemn him.
A criminal trial is in part a search for truth. But it is also a system designed
to protect "freedom" by insuring that no one is criminally punished unless the
State has first succeeded in the admittedly difficult task of convincing a jury that
the defendant is guilty. That task is made more difficult by the Bill of Rights,
and the Fifth Amendment may be one of the most difficult of the barriers to
surmount. The Framers decided that the benefits to be derived from the kind of
trial required by the Bill of Rights were well worth any loss in "efficiency" that
resulted.
Id. at 113-14.
Several courts have relied on Black's dissent to hold that their state constitutional counterpart
to the fifth amendment protects the defendant from being ordered to disclose information to
the state which might lighten the prosecution's burden of proof or assist the state in securing
a conviction. See, e.g., In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569
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a defense witness from testifying because of counsel's failure to comply
with a notice-of-alibi rule may be warranted and constitutionally inoffensive
even though such a sanction may have an adverse impact on the defendant's
sixth amendment right to compulsory process and to present a defense.107
Nonetheless, Williams and Taylor also leave unanswered significant consti-
tutional questions regarding the extent to which a criminal defendant may
be forced to provide to the prosecutor, before trial, information beyond
that relating to an alibi defense.
The Allen decision glosses over any serious constitutional analysis by
summarily concluding that compelling a defendant to make pre-trial disclo-
sures is "merely a matter of timing."'' 0 In Williams Justice White did argue
that the notice-o F-alibi rule only compels a defendant to accelerate a disclo-
sure which would otherwise be made at trial when the alibi witnesses actually
were called. 109 Since a continuance could be granted to allow the prosecution
to meet surprise alibi testimony at trial without offending the fifth or
fourteenth amendment, White reasoned that forcing the defendant to make
an earlier pre-trial disclosure, thereby avoiding disrupting the trial, is also
permissible."10
The Allen court's reliance on Justice White's timing argument to justify
additional pre-trial defense disclosures, however, is unwarranted. Given the
specific facts in Williams, the defendant's disclosure of an alibi defense did
not provide any incriminating evidence which was used to lessen the state's
burden of proof, to impeach the defendant's testimony, or to adversely
impact the defendant's ability to present a defense. The timing of the
defendant's disclosure in Williams, therefore, had no practical or constitu-
tional significance. In other cases, however, timing will matter and therefore
assume constitutional significance because a defendant compelled to make
pre-trial disclosures will, in fact, be incriminated by those disclosures.
Accordingly, Justice White's timing argument cannot be read expansively
because it fails to adequately consider the fact that a defendant forced to
(1985); Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974). But see, e.g., State ex rel. Carkulis v.
District Court, 229 Mont. 265, 746 P.2d 604 (1987); State v. Yates, 765 P.2d 291 (Wash.
1988); Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 815 P.2d 304, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991).
107. Taylor v. Illinoi;, 484 U.S. 400 (1988); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743
(1991) (holding that a Michigan statute requiring defense counsel to give notice of an intent
to use evidence of a prior sexual relationship with the complainant in a rape case was not per
se unconstitutional and that preclusion of defense testimony as a penalty for a discovery
violation may be appropriate in some cases).
108. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
109. Williams, 399 U.S. at 85.
110. Justice White stated:
Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of
constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announcing the
nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to await the jury's verdict
on the State's case-in-chief before deciding whether or not to take the stand
himself.
Williams, 399 U.S. at 85.
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make disclosures before trial often is in a markedly different position from
that of the defendant after the prosecution has rested."'
Moreover, this timing argument underplays the fact that our adversary
system has placed the entire burden of proof on the state and extended to
the defendant the presumption of innocence while also guaranteeing .the
defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. Forcing a defendant
to disclose witnesses to the prosecution before the trial creates the risk that
the prosecution may gain additional incriminating evidence from its follow-
up investigation. This evidence then will be used to lessen the state's burden
of proof in its case-in-chief." 2 Advance notice of witnesses may not only
allow the prosecution to shore up its own case, but also may give the
prosecutor, who possesses superior investigative forces, even more time to
secure impeachment evidence and to challenge the defense's case.'
111. As Justice Black accurately observes,
When a defendant is required to indicate whether he might plead alibi in advance
of trial, he faces a vastly different decision from that faced by one who can wait
until the State has presented the case against him before making up his mind.
Before trial the defendant knows only what the State's case might be. Before
trial there is no such thing as the "strength of the State's case"; there is only a
range of possible cases. At that time there is no certainty as to what kind of
case the State will ultimately be able to prove at trial. Therefore any appraisal
of the desirability of pleading alibi will be beset with guesswork and gambling
far greater than that accompanying the decision at trial itself. Any lawyer who
has actually tried a case knows that, regardless of the amount of pretrial prep-
aration, a case looks far different when it is actually being tried than when it is
only being thought about.
Id. at 109 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a similar criticism of
White's argument, see Van Kessel, infra note 113, at 877. See also Scott v. State, 519 P.2d
774, 783 (Alaska 1974) (rejecting as unpersuasive White's timing rationale).
112. In a self-defense case, for example, defense counsel may wish to wait until the conclusion
of the state's case to decide if counsel wants to call a particular witness located by the defense
because that witness' testimony is incriminating as well as exculpatory. If the state's case-in-
chief is weak, counsel may choose not to call that witness and no disclosure would ever occur.
The pre-trial identification of this witness, however, gives the state the option to use this
witness to buttress its own case. For an excellent discussion of the constitutional problems
created when the state is permitted to use compelled defense disclosures in its case-in-chief,
see Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL7. L.
Rav. 1567, 1587-88, 1623-35 (1986). See also infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the court's efforts in Allen to limit the state's use of information obtained from
the defendant.
113. For a discussion of the imbalance in favor of the state in criminal cases and the extent
to which prosecutorial discovery will aggravate the defendant's disadvantages, see Allis, Lim-
itations on Prosecutorial Discovery of the Defense Case in Federal Courts: The Shield of
Confidentiality, 50 S. CAL. L. Rav. 461 (1977). Among the problems facing defense counsel
is the difficulty of securing the cooperation of witnesses to testify on behalf of a defendant.
Pre-trial identification of witnesses means an increase in police interviews of those witnesses
which in turn decreases the willingness of many already reluctant people to continue to be
involved. Although the prosecution also has witness problems, the state has more means at its
disposal to encourage cooperation. For example, a defense witness with an outstanding warrant
for parking tickets may refuse to come to court for fear of arrest. A prosecution witness with
the same problem is not similarly intimidated. Parking tickets, transportation problems and
child care concerns deter even friendly witnesses from testifying for the indigent defendant.
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Additionally, hampered by inadequate investigative resources and time
pressures, the defense may be very uncertain as to what defense to assert
in a notice." 4 The defendant subsequently may feel locked into a particular
defense as a result of a notice given before the defense investigation was
complete. Fear of being impeached directly or indirectly by one's own
premature disclosures, therefore, may affect adversely the defendant's de-
cision to take the witness stand at trial." 5 Not surprisingly, some state courts
rejected Williams and concluded that compelling the defendant to make
certain pre-trial di;closures violated the state constitutional counterpart to
the fifth amendment."16
Indeed, a broad reading of Williams threatens fundamental values tradi-
tionally protected by the fifth amendment. As the Supreme Court detailed
in Murphy v. Waterford Commission,"7 the fifth amendment reflects:
[O]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our pref-
erence for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will
be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair
play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring
the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load;" our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the
right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead
a private life;" our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and
our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to
the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent." ' 8
But see Van Kessel, Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
Accommodation or Capitulation, 4 HAsTiNcs CONST. L.Q. 855 (1977) (arguing that although
state often has superior resources, it is not unfair to give prosecutor chance to investigate and
prepare, despite threat of intimidation to defense witnesses, as long as prosecutorial use limited
to rebuttal or impeachment).
114. See Westen, Order of Proof. An Accused's Right to Control the Timing and Sequence
of Evidence in His Defense, 66 CALIf. L. REv. 935, 949-52 (1978). The uncertainty felt by the
defendant who has to provide an alibi notice and list of witnesses in some cases can be similar
to the uncertainty faced by the defendant in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972)
(unfettered choice to take the witness stand impermissibly burdened by state statute controlling
the timing of the defendant's testimony). See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
Defense uncertainty is exacerbated by limited investigative assistance, difficulty in locating
witnesses, and the refual of many witnesses to agree to testify for the defense.
115. The Allen court attempted to deal with this problem by including a provision making
the disclosure statement itself inadmissible against the defendant. See infra notes 149-51 and
accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985);
Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
117. 378 U.S. 52 (1954).
118. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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The fifth amendment also preserves our adversary system of criminal
justice, which is "undermined when a government deliberately seeks to
avoid the burdens of independent investigation by compelling self-incrimi-
nating disclosure.""19 In light of the United States Supreme Court's long-
standing commitment to fifth amendment values120 Williams must be read
narrowly so as to not compromise those values. Supreme Court cases both
before and after Williams shed additional light on the proper interpretation
of Williams.
Prior to Williams, the Supreme Court, in Griffin v. California,-' held
that a California practice permitting the court and prosecutor to comment
on the defendant's failure to testify violated the fifth amendment because
it penalized the defendant for exercising a constitutional privilege.-' This
California practice undermined fifth amendment values inherent in the
adversary system by unduly burdening the defendant's assertion of the right
to remain silent.2 The practice, therefore, was unconstitutional because "it
cuto down on the privilege by making its assertion costly."1' 24
Unlike the defendant in Griffin, however, the defendant in Williams did
not pay any cost or suffer any adverse consequence by being compelled to
make a pre-trial disclosure. The defendant in Williams still maintained the
unfettered choice to call his witnesses at trial, which he did without penalty.
Because none of Williams' fifth amendment values were, in fact, adversely
impacted to any appreciable extent, the compulsion to provide the alibi
notice was not sufficiently burdensome so as to warrant constitutional
protection.
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 23 however, the Court found that a Tennessee
statute requiring a criminal defendant desiring to testify to be the first
defense witness or be barred from taking the witness stand constituted an
"impermissible restriction on the defendant's right against self-incrimina-
tion." 126 The defendant was deprived of his fifth amendment right "to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence."' 27 Because the
statute interfered with the ability of criminal defendants to control the
timing of their own testimony, it violated the fifth amendment.- 8
Without expressly doing so, the Brooks decision rejects the Williams
timing analogy. As Brooks points out, trial uncertainties are such that
119. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976).
120. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-63 (1966); Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 461
(1975). For an interesting discussion of the moral basis for the right of self-incrimination
arguing that notions of human dignity require granting criminal defendants this right, see D.
LuBAN, supra note 58, at 177-97.
121. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
122. Id. at 610, 615.
123. Id. at 613.
124. Id. at 614.
125. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
126. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 609.
127. Id. at 609 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
128. Id.
1991]
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defendants often will not know at the end of the state's case whether their
testimony will be needed or helpful.' 29 Unable to realistically assess whether
to testify, a defendant may choose not to testify. Yet applying Justice
White's timing analysis, defendants should not have the right to control
when they are going to make certain disclosures despite their uncertainties. 30
Since the Tennessee statute arguably only controls the timing of a defen-
dant's testimony, it should be constitutional.
Wrong, says Brooks. The fifth amendment ensures that the defendant
has the "unfettered choice" to decide when, as well as if, to take the
witness stand to testify. As a result of the statute, the defendant in Brooks
no longer had an "unfettered choice" when the time came to decide whether
to testify. 31 Rather, the statute imposed "a heavy burden on a defendant's
otherwise unconditional right not to take the stand."' 32 In short, the statute
violated the fifth amendment because it "cutl down on the privilege [to
remain silent] by making its assertion costly."'' 3
Brooks also held that the Tennessee statute infringed on the defendant's
right to due process. The Court again observed that the defense ought to
be able to make the important decision whether the defendant will testify,
after the defense has had the opportunity to evaluate "the actual worth of
their evidence."'13 By forcing the defense to make a premature choice, the
statute unduly restricted defense planning. 3s Accordingly, "the accused is
thereby deprived of the 'guiding hand of counsel' in the timing of this
critical element of his defense.' ' 36 Due process, as well as the privilege
against self-incrimination, demands that the defendant, not the state, should
control the timing of defense disclosures which may significantly affect the
defendant's case. -17
Without apparently considering Brooks, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals looked to the flawed timing argument in Williams to justify pro-
cedures compelling criminal defendants to make extensive pre-trial disclo-
sures. 3 ' Perhaps the court had othe reasons for mandating greater pre-trial
disclosures by defendants. Indeed, the new Allen procedures may represent
the court's careful consideration of some difficult constitutional and policy
questions. Similarly, the court may have significant reasons for deciding to
increase the prosecution's disclosure obligation by adopting the open file
approach suggested by the ABA Standards.3 9 Yet the Allen decision offers
little evidence that the court engaged in a careful analysis of the constitu-
129. Id. at 609-10.
130. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
131. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 610.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 611 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).
134. Id. at 612.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 612-13.
137. Id.
138. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
139. ABA STANiDARDs 11-2.1 & commentary.
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tional implications of the new discovery procedures. Allen fails to adequately
discuss the reasons for its new procedures, or to identify with any precision
the policies to be served by adopting such procedures. Accordingly, trial
judges, prosecutors, and criminal practitioners have little guidance when
implementing and interpreting these new rules. Again, this lack of guidance
will only increase, not minimize, appellate litigation of criminal discovery
issues.
Although the imposition of a limited defense disclosure obligation may
be both constitutional and appropriate when the defendant is raising an
alibi or mental capacity defense,' 40 the Allen procedures do not stop at the
boundaries of Williams. Rather, Allen creates a rule compelling a defendant
to provide to the prosecution before trial the names, addresses, and state-
ments of all witnesses.' 41 This disclosure rule not only represents an unwar-
ranted expansion of Williams, it also infringes on rights guaranteed an
accused by the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments.
The most serious flaw in this disclosure provision is that it extends to all
witnesses regardless of whether the defense intends to call such witnesses at
trial. 42 Obligating a defendant to provide the prosecutor the name of a
witness who the defense has no intention of calling because of the incrim-
inating nature of that witness' testimony blatantly violates the privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment and article II,
section 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution. 43 It simply is not constitutionally
permissible to compel a defendant by threat of sanctions to supply the
prosecution a statement which in turn may be used to establish the defen-
dant's guilt. 4" The fifth amendment clearly protects citizens from being
140. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). Disclosures relating to a defendant's mental
capacity defense have been justified because the defendant arguably is the only reliable source
of evidence as to defendant's true mental state. United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724
(4th Cir. 1968). Nonetheless, the state's use of the defendant's disclosures generally has been
restricted to rebuttal. See Mosteller, supra note 112, at 1612-16.
141. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
142. It may be that the court only intended, in 1(a), to require disclosure of witnesses the
defense intends to call. Yet in 1(b) and 1(c), the Allen court included specific language indicating
these provisions only apply to witnesses to be called. Id. The absence of that language in 1(a)
suggests a broader disclosure obligation.
143. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d
637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985). Reflecting on the fifth amendment's "ancient roots," Chief
Justice Burger observed, "This Court has always broadly construed its protection to assure
that an individual is not compelled to produce evidence which later may be used against him
as an accused in a criminal action." Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975).
Article II, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides in part that "[n]o person shall be
compelled to give evidence which will tend to incriminate him . . . ." OKLA. CoNsT. art. II, §
21. The Oklahoma Supreme Court also declared that the privilege against self-incrimination
under article II, § 1 should be accorded a "liberal construction in favor of the right it was
intended to secure." Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Robinson, 512 P.2d 128, 133 (Okla.
1973). The privilege may be claimed when an answer "will, or might become a link in the
chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by the witness, or would be a source
from which evidence of his commission of a crime might be obtained." Id. at 33.
144. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); see also Van Kessel, supra note 113, at
1991]
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compelled to produce a testimonial communication which later may be used
against them in a criminal action. 41 Moreover, this protection extends to
any information which would be a source of incriminating evidence or
"which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could lead to
prosecution .... ""4
Thus, Allen's first defense disclosure requirement offends the fifth amend-
ment because it compels the defendant to make a testimonial assertion which
may be incriminating. Furthermore, the requirement is offensive to tradi-
tional fifth amendment principles because it extracts evidence from the
"mouth of the defendant" instead of requiring the state to "shoulder the
entire load."' 147 Finally, the disclosure requirement sufficiently burdens the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination so that any legitimate benefit
gained by the state through the imposition of this disclosure procedure is
far outweighed by the costs.'4
It is not enough that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals included
a provision in Allen stating that a
statement filed under subdivision 1.(a) (b) or (c) is not admissible
in evidence at trial. All information obtained as a result of a
statement filed under this subdivision is not admissible in evidence
at trial except to refute the testimony of a witness whose identity
this subdivision requires to be disclosed. 49
This provision forbids the prosecution from using any evidence in its case-
in-chief which directly or indirectly was the product of the defendant's
compelled disclosure. It also prohibits the prosecution from using a disclo-
145. Id. at 408; .,ee also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892); Arndstein v.
McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 72-73 (1920).
146. Maness, 419 U.S. at 461. See also Robinson, 512 P.2d at 133.
147. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). For other cases recognizing
that among the many values protected by the fifth amendment is the principle that the fifth
amendment preserves the integrity of the adversary system by forcing the prosecution to
shoulder the entire load in establishing the defendant's guilt, see Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 414-15 (1966), limited on other grounds, Johnson v. State, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966);
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976).
148. The disclosure rule arguably benefits the state by improving efficiency and minimizing
unfair surprise. There is no solid evidence, however, that such a defense disclosure requirement
produces more efficiency or really is necessary to achieve the desired ends. Mosteller, supra
note 112, at 1607-09.
Even if the disclosure rule would achieve more efficiency, our adversary system and consti-
tutional protections ensure that the state performs the difficult task of proving the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Admittedly,
that task is made more difficult by The Bill of Rights, and the Fifth Amendment
may be one of the most difficult of the barriers to surmount. The Framers
decided that the benefits to be derived from the kind of trial required by The
Bill of Rights were well worth any loss in 'efficiency' that resulted.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
149. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168. ABA STMMRws 11-3.3(b) contains substantially similar
wording.
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sure statement to impeach a defendant who chooses, for example, to aban-
don an alibi defense. 150 Certainly the fifth amendment demands no less.15'
Nonetheless, even if this provision limiting the evidentiary use of defense
disclosures saves the disclosure requirement from violating the fifth amend-
ment, compelled production of names of witnesses and their statements will
generate more needless and wasteful litigation regarding the source of
testimony introduced at trial. Judicial time and energy will be spent deciding
whether the state's witnesses were discovered as a result of defense disclo-
sures or leads furnished as a result of those disclosures. Testimony of the
state's witnesses will have to be scrutinized to determine if it was influenced
by defense disclosures relied upon by the prosecutor when preparing the
witnesses for trial. Any marginal gain to the prosecutor in discovering new
information will be offset by the difficulties and administrative costs in
proving that the evidence presented in the state's case-in-chief was not the
"tainted" product of a defense disclosure. 52
It is not only the fifth amendment, however, which must be considered
in assessing the constitutionality of Allen's new discovery provisions. The
sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel is also adversely
affected by these disclosure obligations. The sixth amendment ensures crim-
inal defendants that their lawyers will function as zealous advocates on their
behalf. 53 The sixth amendment overlaps with the fifth amendment as well
as with the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine to protect
150. The use of a compelled discovery statement to impeach a defendant's trial testimony
surely violates fifth amendment principles set forth in Garner v. United States and Brooks v.
Tennessee. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 609-13 (1972). A number of other state cases hold that the state's use of an
abandoned notice is unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Curby, 553 S.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1977); State ex rel. Sikora v. District Court, 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897, 903
(1969). But see, e.g., State v. Meadows, 635 S.W.2d 400, 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)
(impeachment of defendant due to failure to call listed alibi witness permitted because state
statute did not expressly forbid such impeachment). Given the problems which frequently delay
or frustrate defense investigation, such as the defendant's incarceration, inability to locate
witnesses and secure their cooperation, and lack of investigative assistance, the defense may
be forced to make a premature disclosure which subsequently turns out to be inaccurate. As
in Brooks, a criminal defendant should not be penalized for making an early uncertain
disclosure. This is especially so because even under Williams, the defendant has "an unfettered
choice" to abandon, a defense. Williams, 399 U.S. at 110. The choice is hardly "unfettered"
if a defendant could be impeached by means of an abandoned alibi statement. For a recent
case in which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the impropriety of a
prosecutor's use of a withdrawn notice of alibi, see Jackson v. State, 808 P.2d 700 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1991).
151. Mosteller, supra note 112, at 1619. For a more expansive view of the fifth amendment,
see supra note 106 and In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569
(1985). In holding that a California statutory provision requiring disclosure of defense witness
statements violates a defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Misener declared "there is no doubt that the evisceration of a defense
'incriminates' the defendant." Id., 698 P.2d at 556.
152. See Mosteller, supra note 112, at 1632-35; Van Kessel, supra note 113, at 896-98.
153. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
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defense communications and trial preparation from state interference. 5 4
Defense counsel cannot be obligated, therefore, to identify incriminating
witnesses when counsel's knowledge of their existence is based on confiden-
tial communications with the client. The attorney-client privilege allows an
attorney to refuse to produce or disclose incriminating information when
the client would have been privileged under the fifth amendment to refuse
to divulge that information. 15 Even if defense counsel learns of incriminating
witnesses through counsel's own effort or those of an investigator working
on the defendant's behalf, counsel cannot be obligated to reveal these
adverse witnesses, under existing ethical and constitutional principles.
5 6
The sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel is mean-
ingful only if a defendant's communications with counsel are protected and
a defendant's laviful preparation for trial is secure against government
intrusion. 5 7 The defendant has a right to insist that the state conduct its
own investigation and that the defense not be forced to do the prosecution's
work. This is particularly so, given the tremendous investigative advantages
154. This overlapping of constitutional protections with various fundamental principles of
the adversary system has been described as creating a "shield of confidentiality." Allis, supra
note 113, at 483. The attorney-client privilege, a common law creation, ensures criminal
defendants that their communications with their attorneys will be kept confidential. The
privilege was designed to promote the "full and frank" discourse between lawyer and client
so as to enable counsel to provide "sound legal advice or advocacy." UpJohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Similarly, courts'have provided protection to a client's
communications with counsel or counsel's agents under the sixth amendment. See, e.g., United
States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Warrant Authorizing the
Interception of Oral Communications, 521 F. Supp. 190 (D.N.H. 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 673 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982); State v. Pratt, 284 Md. App. 516, 398 A.2d 421 (1979).
See also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the sixth amendment establishes an independent right to confidential communications with
defense counsel).
For a discussion of the work-product doctrine, see infra notes 163-67 and accompanying
text.
155. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404 (1976).
156. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 58, at 87-108. Defense counsel does have an ethical duty
not to knowingly offer false evidence. OKLA omsA RuLs op PRorsSSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3
(1988). See also supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
157. In State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim. 94, 130 P. 962 (1913), the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that a defendant has an absolute right to consult with
defense counsel free of state interference. Id. at 963. In waxing eloquently about "the
fundamental and univ-rsal principles of American criminal law," the court observed that
if the right of defense exists, it includes and carries with it the right of such
freedom of action as is essential and necessary to make such defense complete
... there can be no such thing as due process of law where a party to a case
has been deprived of an opportunity to prepare for trial ... the right to be
heard by counsel would, in the language of Saint Paul, I Cor. 13,1, "become
as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal," if it did not include the right to a full
and confidential consultation with such counsel with no other person present to
hear what was said. This is a material, substantial right, essential to justice.
Id. at 963-64. See also State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 417 A.2d 474 (1980) (premature disclosure
of trial strategy or inhibition of free exchange between attorney and client constitutes substantial
infringement on defendant's right to counsel), cert. denied, 122 N.J. 187, 584 A.2d 247 (1990).
HeinOnline  -- 44 Okla. L. Rev. 416 1991
1991] THE NEW CRIMINAL DISCOVERY CODE 417
the state possesses and the difficulties facing the defense in conducting an
adequate investigation. 58 Forcing defense counsel to turn over the fruits of
counsel's labor constitutes unwarranted government intrusion and interfer-
ence with the attorney-client relationship, in violation of the sixth amend-
ment.15 9 Indeed, compelling defense counsel to become an agent of the state,
assisting in the gathering of information which may be used against the
defendant, thereby chills defense investigation and weakens the defendant's
confidence and trust in counsel.
Many criminal defendants, especially indigents with assigned or appointed
counsel, are reluctant to trust their lawyers. 16° Yet it is clear that trust
between lawyer and client is essential if counsel is to provide effective
representation to the client. 161 Restructuring the defense lawyer's role to
make counsel less of an advocate only will exacerbate existing strains on
the relationship between counsel and the criminal defendant. 62 Further
handicapping the already beleaguered defense lawyer struggling to represent
the indigent defendant will not improve the quality of justice. Rather,
weakening the attorney-client relationship will hamper counsel's ability to
effectively represent the accused and add to the growing number of inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims.
In addition to the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine
provides added protection to defense counsel's efforts on behalf of a criminal
client. As the Court noted in United States v. Nobles,163 the work-product
doctrine still plays an important role "in assuring the proper functioning
158. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. For cases insisting that the defendant has
a right to require the prosecution to investigate its own case and not rely on defense counsel's
efforts, see, e.g., Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1987); United States v. Wright,
489 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Williams, 80 N.J. 472, 404 A.2d 34 (1979).
159. See State v. Williams, 80 N.J. 472, 404 A.2d 34 (1979) (requiring defense counsel to
disclose victim's identification of defendant when interviewed by defense violates defendant's
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel); State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 392
A.2d 590 (1978) (compelled disclosure of inculpatory defense expert's report chilled effective
assistance of counsel).
160. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Ted
Schneyer has observed, there are many forces at work in the criminal justice system that tempt
criminal defense lawyers to be or, at least appear to their clients to be, "unreliable advisors
or indifferent advocates." Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, J. OF LEGAL EDUC.,
Mar. 1991, at 11, 23-24. In light of the inadequate representation provided to many defendants,
the lack of trust is hardly surprising. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. For an
excellent study empirically demonstrating that clients mistrust appointed lawyers, especially
public defenders, and analyzing the reasons for this mistrust, see J. CASPER, CRMHNAL COURTS:
THE DEFENDAT'S PERSPECTV E (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
1978).
161. For an excellent discussion of the importance of trust and confidentiality to the attorney-
client relationship and to the adversary system, see M. FREEDMAN, supra note 58, at 87-108.
162. Numerous commentators have detailed the difficult hurdles the defense lawyer must
overcome to establish a relationship of trust with a defendant, especially when counsel is
appointed, not retained. See, e.g., Allis, supra note 113, at 477-78. See generally J. CASPER,
supra note 160.
163. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
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of the criminal justice system . ... " The practical realities of our adver-
sary system require that lawyers rely on investigators and other agents to
assist in the preparation of a defense. Nobles recognizes that the work-
product doctrine acts to safeguard the premature disclosure of a lawyer's
effort in preparing for trial.'6 This does not mean, however, that the
protections of the work-product doctrine should be applied equally. Rather,
broader protection must be given to defense counsel's trial preparation if
the defendant's constitutional rights and the policies underlying our adver-
sary system are to be adequately served.'6 Moreover, the vast advantages
enjoyed by the prosecution in the investigation and presentation of a criminal
case dictate that defense counsel be able to plot trial strategy, consult with
experts, and interview witnesses without fear that the state will be allowed
pre-trial discovery which will undermine counsel's efforts. 67
Unlike Allen, the ABA Standards do not require the defense to identify
all witnesses or turn over any witness statements to the prosecution. The
164. Id. at 238. Although Nobles is cited often as a case supportive of the constitutionality
of defense-mandated discovery, the case really says little about compelling pre-trial disclosures.
Rather, the defendant in Nobles sought to offer the testimony of a defense investigator at
trial. By voluntarily calling the witness, the defendant waived his right to shield that witness
from producing a document generated by that witness. Id. at 239.
165. The Court did not detail the full scope of the work-product doctrine because the
defendant waived the protection of the doctrine by calling the investigator as a witness. Id.
166. See Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 116 (D.C. 1979); State v. Whitaker,
202 Conn. 259, 520 A2d 1018, 1023 (1987); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (Mikva, J., concurring).
167. Besides greater financial and staff resources with which to investigate and
scientifically analyze evidence, the prosecutor has a number of tactical advantages.
First, he begins his investigation shortly after the crime has been committed when
physical evidence is more likely to be found and when witnesses are more apt to
remember events. Only after the prosecutor has gathered sufficient evidence is
the defendant informed of the charges against him; by the time the defendant
or his attorney begins any investigation into the facts of the case, the trail is not
only cold, but a diligent prosecutor will have removed much of the evidence from
the field. In addition to the advantage of timing, the prosecutor may compel
people, including the defendant, to cooperate. The defendant may be questioned
within limits, and if arrested his person may be searched. He may also be
compelled to participate in various nontestimonial identification procedures. The
prosecutor may force third persons to cooperate through the use of grand juries
and may issue subpoenas requiring appearances before prosecutorial investigatory
boards. With probable cause the police may search private areas and seize evidence
and may tap telephone conversations. They may use undercover agents and have
access to vast amounts of information in government files. Finally, respect for
government authority will cause many people to cooperate with the police or
prosecutor voluntarily when they might not cooperate with the defendant.
Note, Prosecutorial Divcovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HAgv. L. REv. 994, 1018-19 (1972)
(footnotes omitted). Justice Marshall cited this same quote in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.
470, 476 n.9 (1973). Except in the rarest of cases, the state has a tremendous edge in resources
and investigative tools. See Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution
- The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. Rav. 437, 439-42 (1972); Gold-
stein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J.
1149, 1152 (1960); Rosen, supra note 95, at 694.
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drafters of the ABA Standards sought to craft their procedures so as to
avoid undercutting the defendant's presumption of innocence or lessening
the prosecution's obligation to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt without the compelled assistance of defense counsel. ABA
Standard 11-3.3 requires the defendant to provide only notice of the names
and addresses of intended defense witnesses when the defendant seeks to
raise an alibi or mental capacity defense.1 6s These two defenses have been
singled out because they demand special preparation and advance investi-
gation by the prosecution and, in the case of the insanity defense, rebuttal
information largely is in the possession or control of the defense. In addition,
disclosure of these defenses at trial is more likely to unfairly surprise a
prosecutor, necessitating delay or a continuance. 169
Nonetheless, even ABA Standard 11-3.3 goes too far. Although compelling
a defendant to disclose the names and addresses of alibi and mental capacity
witnesses may survive constitutional challenge, 17 0 such a requirement still
adversely impacts important protections long afforded criminal defendants
in our adversary system. The benefits of such a disclosure requirement are
far outweighed by the costs.' 7'
The adversary system is designed to provide the criminal defendant a
zealous advocate who, combined with a host of constitutional guarantees,
safeguards the accused from the power of the state. Respect for the dignity
of the individual and concern about state misuse of its awesome power to
convict and punish influenced the development of this country's adversary
168. ABA STANmARDs 11-3.3 also contains a provision limiting the state's use of information
obtained as a result of a defense disclosure to its case-in-chief and barring use of the disclosure
as evidence.
169. Although eliminating all surprise at trial is neither a feasible nor desirable goal of a
discovery scheme, alibi and mental capacity defenses pose unusual difficulty for the state and
present the strongest case for allowing pre-trial prosecutorial discovery. See ABA STANDARDs 11-
55.
170. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). But see supra notes 110-20 and accompanying
text. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided that the different language in article
2, § 21 of the Oklahoma Constitution did not grant any broader protection than that embodied
within the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Thomason, 538 P.2d
1080, 1086 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). Nonetheless, the court has the authority to disregard
Williams and to interpret Oklahoma's privilege against self-incrimination so as to bar the
compelled disclosure of witnesses even in alibi or mental capacity cases. See, e.g., Heitman v.
State, No. 1380-89 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. June 26, 1991) (Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
decided it was no longer bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court when
interpreting its state counterpart to the fourth amendment).
171. See supra note 151-52 and accompanying text. The prosecution benefits from advance
notice of these witnesses by being able to interview those witnesses thereby improving the
prosecutor's ability to rebut the defense. Having the witnesses' names helps focus the inves-
tigation but notice of the defense by itself provides sufficient direction to the state. There is
no empirical evidence demonstrating a prosecutorial need for assistance in combatting bogus
alibi or mental capacity defenses. Rather, legislative inaction in Oklahoma supports the
argument that the state has little need for the names of defense witnesses. For an additional
discussion of the lack of the prosecutor's need for these disclosures, see Mosteller, supra note
112, at 1631-35; Van Kessel, supra note 113, at 898.
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system of criminal justice. 7 2 This adversary system relies on the defense
lawyer's efforts ar, well as procedural and substantive protections such as
the burden of proof, presumption of innocence, and due process to ensure
that citizens are not wrongly or unjustly convicted. "Wrongly convicted"
speaks to our society's fundamental concern that innocent people not be
convicted. 73 "Unjustly convicted" reflects society's equally vital concern
that individual dignity be respected and that the state secures the conviction
of an accused person only by fair and just means. 74 The result, of course,
is that on occasion our system allows a guilty person to escape conviction.
Our system tolerates some lost efficiency, however, as a cost of "preserving
respect for human dignity" and "freedom from an overreaching govern-
ment."M75
Moreover, the adversary system has been designed to somewhat balance
the impressive advantage which the state possesses when it chooses to unleash
the forces of criminal prosecution against an individual.' 76 Accordingly, the
system is structured deliberately so that the rights and responsibilities of the
state and the defense are not equal or balanced. As already discussed,'77
the prosecutor has a special obligation to serve the cause of justice. So also,
172. For an excellert summary of the basic principles underlying the American adversary
system of criminal justice, see W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRMNAL PROCEDURE 24-32 (1985) and
M. FREEDMAN, supra note 58, at 13-42. See also D. LUBAN, supra note 58, at 58-63 (adversary
system attempts to handicap the state so as to curb abuses of power and protect civil liberties
of all citizens).
173. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (It is a "funda-
mental value determination of our system that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than
to let a guilty man go free.").
174. Almost eighty years ago in State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim. 94, 130 P. 962
(1913), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized the importance of ensuring that fair
means were employed by the state in seeking a conviction. In chastising law enforcement officers
for interfering with the defendant's right to consult with counsel, the court declared:
It matters not what the officers may think of the guilt of a defendant, the law
presumes that he is innocent until his guilt has been legally pronounced by an
impartial jury in a fair trial. It matters not how humble, poor, or friendless he may
be, or how strong and influential the feeling against him, it is his absolute right to
have a fair oppcrtunity to prepare for trial and to present his defense. The law is
not hunting for victims or seeking to offer up vicarious atonements. Punishment
should never be inflicted as such before a conviction, and there should be no
conviction, unles3 it be legally established to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him. No
attempt to railroad any man to the penitentiary or to the gallows, it matters not
how guilty he may be, should for one moment be tolerated by any court. If a
defendant cannot be convicted without denying him a reasonable opportunity to
prepare for trial and a fair trial, he should not be convicted at all. Any other rule
would make a myth of justice and a snare and delusion of courts.
Id., 130 P. at 964.
175. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 172, at 30.
176. See supra notes 85, 167 and accompanying text. See also D. LuBAN, supra note 58, at
60-61 (arguing that criminal defendants enjoy no real advantages and that their rights mean
little because of the plea bargaining process and the harsh realities of the criminal justice
system).
177. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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defense counsel has a special role to play in the adversary system.178 It is
the defense lawyer who stands with the accused to ensure that the state
indeed affords the defendant the rights guaranteed by the adversary system
and the Constitution. 179
The reality of the criminal justice system, however, is that all too often
defense counsel does little more than stand with the defendant. 80 Over-
worked public defenders and inadequately compensated appointed lawyers
struggle to provide even minimally competent representation. Too many
178. As Justice Powell observed:
IT]he duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an "officer of the court," is to
further the interests of his clients by all lawful means, even when these interests
are in conflict with the interests of the United States or of a State. But this
representation involves no conflict of interest in the invidious sense. Rather, it
casts the lawyer in his honored and traditional role as an authorized but inde-
pendent agent acting to vindicate the legal rights of a client, whoever it may be.
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973). See also supra note 58-62 and accompanying
text.
179. The Model Code states:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition
of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for
the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-
government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only through such law
does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protection. Without it,
individual rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect for law is de-
stroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of
society.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmIBn- preamble (1981). See also Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) ("lawyer is the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the
protector of the legal rights of that person in his dealings with the police and the courts").
180. In their thorough study of indigent representation in New York City, Michael Mc-
Conville and Chester Mirsky conclude that
lawyers for the poor in criminal cases infrequently test the State's case and
insufficiently protect defendant's rights. Investigation and adjudicative fact-find-
ing is generally absent. Attorneys conduct these day to day activities without
client interviews and with little regard for their clients' concerns. The rights of
poor people charged with crime have a life only in the rhetoric of the system.
McConville & Mirsky, supra note 85, at 901. Unfortunately, as McConville and Mirsky also
point out, the crisis in New York mirrors the crisis in the delivery of adequate defense services
across the United States. Id. at 583. Among the many other studies detailing the inadequacies
of much of the representation provided criminal defendants, see N. LEFSTEIN, CTHNmAL DEFENSE
SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND
THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING (1982); NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, THE
OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE (1973); R. SPANGENERG, B. LEE, M. BATTAGLIA, P. SMITH & A.
DAVIS, NATIONAL CRIMNAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1986). Moreover, a recent
report prepared by the United Nations Development Program identified the inadequacy of
representation provided the poor as a significant shortcoming in the United States' Freedom
Index. Land of the Semi-Free? America Ranks 13th in Liberty, U.N. Says, Washington (D.C.)
Times, May 23, 1991, at Al. See also supra note 79.
Finally, while there are dedicated lawyers striving to provide quality services, the represen-
tation provided many defendants in Oklahoma reflects the same poor quality afforded most
defendants nationally. See FINAL REPORT OF ma SPANGENBERG GROUP ON OKLAHOMA INDIGENT
DEFENSE (1988).
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lawyers plead their clients guilty without adequately investigating the facts
or the law. Few criminal defense lawyers spend sufficient time talking with
their clients. Thus, deals are struck and pleas are entered with defendants
only partially understanding what is happening. In addition, inexperienced
defense lawyers routinely waive issues and rights with defendants frequently
bound by counsel's decisions, despite the client's lack of input into the
decision-making process. Lack of investigative help, limited or no access to
experts, and the pressures of an overburdened, underfunded system driven
by plea bargaining make zealous advocacy by a defense lawyer the exception,
not the rule.'8' For many criminal defendants, then, the sixth amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel remains only an abstract promise,
not a reality.'8 2
The fact that society presently is unsuccessfully struggling to make the
sixth amendment meaningful for all of its citizens does not diminish the
importance of the right to effective assistance of counsel. It is a significant
variable to consider, however, in determining whether to make structural
changes in the criminal justice system. Expanding prosecutorial discovery
of the defense case is a significant structural change creating additional
pressure on defense counsel without any clear showing of need on the part
of the prosecution for this change.' The right to a zealous advocate ought
not be compromised, but should rather be reaffirmed.
Fortunately, the Oklahoma legislature has not embraced this effort to
diminish a defendant's right to an effective, zealous advocate. 84 It was not
until 1935 that the Oklahoma legislature adopted a limited notice-of-alibi
rule, a provision merely granting the prosecution the opportunity to obtain
a postponement of the trial if the defense introduced an alibi without having
given any prior notice to the prosecutor. 185 Despite Williams and the Okla-
homa legislature's consideration of various criminal discovery bills, this
181. See Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney - New Answers to Old
Questions, 32 STAN. L. REv. 293, 319-20 (1980); Rakoff, How Can You Defend Those Crooks?,
CHAMPION, Aug. 1991, at 12, 14; supra note 85.
182. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 85, at 582-83.
183. Although there is a demonstrated need to expand defense discovery to improve the
poor quality of defense representation afforded to many defendants, there is no solid evidence
of any real need for prosecutorial discovery. As the court noted in Middleton v. United States,
in holding that the trial judge erred in ordering defense counsel to give the prosecutor before
trial witness statements obtained by her investigator, "however appealing the notion of full
disclosure may be in the abstract, important constitutional and societal interests affected by
the criminal discovery process counsel against a casual acceptance of such a major revision of
the established statutory schemes." Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 121 (D.C. 1979).
184. Moreover, the passage of the new Indigent Defense Act reflects the Oklahoma legis-
lature's recognition that there is a need to improve the quality of representation provided to
indigent criminal defendants. Indigent Defense Act, 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355 (Supp. 1990).
Although an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of this new statute is beyond the scope
of this article, it remains to be seen whether adequate funding will be provided to the new
Indigent Defense System so that it indeed will enhance the quality of defense services in
Oklahoma.
185. 22 OKLA. STT. § 585 (1981); see also supra note 66.
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statute has not been amended.1 6 Moreover, in its 1985 enactment of title
22, section 1176 requiring notice of an insanity defense, the Oklahoma
legislature again could have required the defendant to include a list of
defense witnesses, but did not.8 7 Legislative inaction reflects sound public
policy militating against a significant reordering of the criminal defense
lawyer's role.
The Allen court erred in relying on the two-way street analogy8' to justify
imposing additional disclosure obligations on the defense. The concept of
symmetrical discovery rests on the faulty assumption that the primary task
of the defense and the state is the same: to achieve an accurate determination
of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Clearly that is an important
goal of the system. It is not, however, the primary goal of the accused or
the defense lawyer, nor should it be under our constitutional system. l 9 By
focusing too heavily on the search for truth, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals in Allen requires too much from the defense.
The defense should be limited, then, to providing the prosecution notice
of an alibi or mental capacity defense, but should not be required to provide
the name of any witness or any statements. Although mandating defense
disclosure of names of alibi and mental capacity witnesses arguably is
unsound policy, forcing the defense to provide witness statements before
trial is even worse. If the prosecutor is to be given the names of defense
alibi and mental capacity witnesses, unfair surprise is no longer an issue.
With its investigative advantages and ability to compel cooperation,' 9° the
prosecution can interview these witnesses or conduct whatever investigation
the prosecutor deems necessary. If defense counsel takes a statement from
a prospective alibi witness, counsel frequently will choose to disclose that
statement during negotiations. If counsel decides for whatever reason not
to provide the prosecutor that statement, counsel should not be forced to
do so at the expense of the attorney-client relationship and the defendant's
right to an effective defense simply to ease the prosecutor's investigative
task or enhance the cross-examination of defense witnesses. The limited
186. This is so despite the fact there have been frequent efforts to enact new statutory
provisions regarding criminal discovery. Lee, supra note 11, at 2259.
187. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1176 (Supp. 1990). As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
recognized, "the Legislature, within whose exclusive province it is to enact laws governing
public policy, addressed itself to the subject and when the Legislature had considered the
subject, this Court is by law powerless to modify or extend that statutory enactment in matters
which are criminal in nature." Freshour v. Turner, 496 P.2d 389, 393 (Okla. Crim. App.
1972), overruled on other grounds, Dean v. Crisp, 536 P.2d 961, 963 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
Since the Oklahoma legislature has enacted provisions covering alibi and mental capacity
defenses, the Allen court's effort to expand defense disclosure requirements as to these defenses
constitutes judicial rule-making, arguably violative of the separation of powers doctrine. See
supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 104-116 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. See also Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774
(Alaska 1974) ("two-way street" analogy falls because of defendant's constitutional rights and
prosecutorial advantages).
190. See supra note 167.
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benefit the prosecutor would obtain by receiving pre-trial statements of the
defense witnesses certainly does not justify such a radical departure from
traditional notions of the proper role of defense counsel in the adversary
system. '91
Nevertheless, the defense should be required to disclose expert reports as
called for in paragraph 2(b) of the Allen procedures. 192 Like defense counsel,
the prosecutor needs time prior to trial to review statistics and other technical
information in order to adequately respond to expert testimony. Advance
disclosure also aids the efficient and orderly presentation of expert testimony
at trial. Allen wisely includes provisions limiting the use of these defense
disclosures to rebuttal 9 and disallowing cross-examination of the fact that
the defense did not offer certain evidence or call a particular witness. 94
Allen does not restrict the disclosure of expert reports and statements as
carefully as does ABA Standard 11-3.2. ABA Standard 11-3.2 only applies
to statements and reports which the defendant intends to introduce at trial,
and they need not be supplied to the prosecutor unless the defendant first
has made a request and received discovery from the state. 95 Realistically,
the defense will not know and should not be forced to decide whether it
intends to call an expert at trial until it has received information from the
state. The Allen provision is problematic because it does not condition
defense disclosure on prior receipt of the prosecution's discovery.
Even more troublesome, however, is paragraph 2(a) of the Allen proce-
dures requiring the defense to provide pre-trial access to the evidence
defendant intends to introduce at trial.'9 In light of Brooks, the work-
product doctrine, e.nd the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance
of counsel, such a provision is constitutionally suspect. Again, such a
requirement interferes with the defense's trial preparation and mandates the
disclosure of information, which undoubtedly will reveal aspects of defense
counsel's trial strategy. Moreover, it infringes on the defense's ability to
control the timing of important decisions such as whether the defendant
will testify. As demonstrated in Brooks, the defendant should have the right
to make trial choices unfettered by previously compelled disclosures.197
191. As supra note 14 and the accompanying text indicate, U.S. v. Nobles does not support
the proposition that a defendant should be compelled prior to trial to provide the prosecutor
witness statements obtained by the defense. See also Van Kessel, supra note 113, at 898 (arguing
that the harm to judicial efficiency and prosecutorial freedom may be too great a cost to pay
for the "incremental benefits" received from mandating defense disclosures).
192. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
193. "Information obtained as a result of disclosure under this subdivision is not admissible
in evidence at trial except to refute the matter disclosed." Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168. ABA
STANDARDS 11-3.2 uses substantially the same wording. But see infra notes 199-200 and
accompanying text.
194. "The fact that the defendant, under this subdivision, has indicated an intent to offer
a matter in evidence or to call a person as a witness is not admissible in evidence at trial."
Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168. ABA STANDARDS 11-3.2 also contains substantially the same language.
See also supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
195. ABA STANDARDs 11-3.2(a).
196. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
197. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
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Forcing the defendant to disclose evidence before trial will, at the very least,
shape the presentation of the state's case, which in turn will affect the
defendant's choices. Thus, compelled pre-trial disclosure of all intended real
evidence may be unconstitutional. 19 The requirement certainly does not
reflect sound policy.
The Allen provision limiting the admissibility of all disclosed evidence to
the state's case-in-chief once more helps to blunt the offensiveness of this
disclosure requirement./99 Nonetheless, this provision creates even more
complications for the prosecutor and the courts. Assume, for example, that
a defendant is charged with negligent homicide as a result of a traffic
accident. Pursuant to Allen, defense counsel must provide the prosecutor
photographs which were taken by the defense shortly after the accident.
The photographs show certain skid marks which the defense intends to use
to rebut the claim that the defendant crossed over the centerline. Having
seen the photographs, the prosecutor talks again with the state's witnesses
about their testimony. If the trial testimony of those witnesses were influ-
enced or affected by the prosecutor's use of the compelled disclosures to
prepare them to testify, or the prosecution tailored its evidence in the state's
case-in-chief to meet anticipated defense evidence, then the inadmissibility
provision built into Allen will have been thwarted. If a constitutional issue
is then raised, the court will have a time-consuming and nearly impossible
task of determining whether the prosecutor's case-in-chief indeed was
tainted. 2oo
In addition to the constitutional problems, other aspects of Allen are
troublesome and warrant clarification. That clarification must begin by
clearly spelling out whether the new Allen procedures apply in misdemeanor
cases. The court initially states that it is addressing the issue of the right
198. Take, for example, a case in which the defense has some potentially incriminating
photographs which counsel is uncertain about introducing at trial. The decision largely turns
on the strength of the state's case-in-chief and whether the defendant will testify. Obviously
under Brooks, the defense wants to see the state's case unfold in its entirety before deciding
whether to offer the photographs into evidence. By being forced to disclose them before trial,
the defense may be providing the state the means to secure the defendant's conviction. The
state then may go out and secure additional evidence which it would not have obtained but
for the lead supplied by the photographs. Neither the Constitution nor the principles underlying
the adversary system tolerate such a result. See supra notes 116-30, 142-67 and accompanying
text.
If the defense takes possession of physical evidence relating to a case, a different result is
warranted. Under these circumstances, a defense attorney generally is obligated to turn over
that physical evidence to the state. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 58, at 645-46. For an interesting
discussion of the difficult ethical issues facing a defense attorney when physical evidence is
involved, see Burkoff, What Do You Do When Your Client Tosses the Murder Weapon on
Your Desk?, CHAMPIo N, Dec. 1986, at 5.
199. "Information obtained as a result of disclosure under this subdivision is not admissible
in evidence at trial except to refute the matter disclosed." Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168. But see
supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
200. Depending on the strength of the state's case, the defendant may choose not to introduce
any photographs or put on any testimony. Thus, absent the compulsion of the disclosure
requirement, the potentially damaging photographs may never come into the possession of the
state. See also supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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of pre-trial discovery in a "felony criminal case." 201 The court also notes
that a district court judge is empowered to act on a discovery motion upon
the entry of a bindover order, which only applies in felony cases. 2 2 Yet the
opinion ends by stating that the procedures "apply to all cases pending in
the district courts . . ."20 It simply is not clear whether the court intends
these procedures to apply in all felony and misdemeanor cases.
The ABA Standards recommend that discovery procedures be applied in
all serious criminal cases.23 By serious cases, the drafters meant to include
all felony and serious misdemeanors, with each jurisdiction to set the point
at which misdemeanors become serious enough to justify use of the full
procedures. 20 5 Unfortunately, Allen does not establish that clear point.
Allen also falls to spell out in much detail the procedures to be followed
to ensure compliance with the new discovery code. Unlike the ABA Stan-
dards, which delineate a three-stage process designed to achieve stated
goals,'0 Allen merely indicates that at some point after the bindover, most
appropriately at the arraignment, the trial judge should issue a written order
setting forth the discovery requirements so that all discovery issues are
resolved at least ten days before trial .20 In an effort to keep its new
procedures simple, however, the Allen court misses the mark. For as the
drafters to the ABA Standards observe, the establishment of detailed reg-
ularized procedures will allow for the development of specific routines for
the pre-trial processing of cases which will inure to the overall benefit of
the criminal justice system. 20 The system will be more orderly, efficient,
and economical, which in turn will improve the preparation of all the actors
in the system, lead to earlier disposition of cases, allow for a more efficient
use of trial time, and enhance the effectiveness of assigned counsel.2 9
The Allen procedures invite too much flexibility, which will result in
widely disparate handling of discovery problems and other pre-trial issues.210
Rather than standardization, trial judges across Oklahoma will grapple with
different mechanisras for responding to Allen, resulting in increased uncer-
tainty for the various actors in the criminal justice system. Again, procedural
uncertainties generate more error, more inefficiencies, and more waste.
201. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
202. Id. at 1167. There is no preliminary hearing in misdemeanor cases. 22 OLA. STAT. §
258 (1981).
203. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1169.
204. ABA STANDARDS 11-1.2.
205. See id. at 11-13.
206. See id. at 11-5.1 & commentary to 11-5.4 & commentary.
207. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
208. ABA STANDARDs 11-73.
209. Id.
210. Giving judges substantial discretion in granting discovery also leads to inequality among
similarly situated defendants. People v. Williams, 90 I1. App. 3d 158, 413 N.E.2d 118 (1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 87 Ill. 2d 161, 429 N.E.2d 487 (1981); see also ABA STANDARDS 11-
12 (recognizing need to keep procedures simple, equally available and reasonably efficient to
ensure that similarly situated defendants are more likely to receive similar treatment).
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Allen also includes a sentence stating that "if the defendant subsequently
ascertains that he has possession or control of such a matter, he shall
promptly so inform the prosecuting attorney. ' 21' Because this sentence is
contained in a paragraph including references to "this subdivision," it
appears that this continuing disclosure obligation only applies to evidence
and reports described in paragraphs 2(a) and (b). The rationale for providing
such a limited continuing disclosure obligation and then only applying it to
the defense is unclear.212 A better approach would be to spell out a specific
continuing duty for both sides, thereby eliminating confusion and repeated
discovery requests. 213
Allen also fails to include any provision for a protective order. Certainly
there will be instances when the state will want to seek such an order to
deny the defense access to information which the prosecutor feels should
not be disclosed.2 4 The court may have concluded that there was no need
to spell out a specific procedure because it was implicit under Oklahoma
law that a party could seek a protective order.2 5 Nevertheless, the inclusion
of a specific provision regarding protective orders would provide more
guidance to prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, and trial judges as to the
procedures and policies to be applied.
Finally, the Allen decision ends by expressly limiting the new procedures
so that discovery cannot be ordered before the preliminary examination. 21 6
The court contends that it cannot allow discovery before the preliminary
hearing because "the provisions of 22 O.S.1981, § 251 et seq. are specific
as to the purpose and scope of a preliminary examination. ' 217 If the court
211. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
212. If the disclosure of expert reports were the court's primary concern, then clearly the
state should also have the same continuing disclosure obligation. This is particularly so in light
of the number of recent cases involving the state's failure to provide timely expert reports.
See supra note 77.
If the court's primary concern were physical evidence, defense counsel already is obligated
to turn over such evidence in the possession of counsel or a defense investigator. See supra
note 198.
Perhaps the court felt that such a continuing disclosure provision was unnecessary for the
state because it was mandating an open file policy. Even so, a provision clearly spelling out
the prosecutor's continuing obligation should have been included in order to avoid unnecessary
confusion and litigation.
213. See ABA STANDARDS 11-4.2 & commentary; infra note 251.
214. One example-would be an investigative report contaihing information about a confi-
dential informant whose testimony is not germane to the defendant's case.
215. Prior to Allen, a trial judge had broad discretion to grant or refuse pre-trial discovery.
Stout v. State, 693 P.2d 617, 624 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1022 (1985).
The trial judge further was empowered "to take necessary action to ensure the rights of each
party are preserved and the court's orders are obeyed." State ex rel. Suttle v. District Court,
795 P.2d 525, 527 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (Lumpkin, J., concurring). Presumably, the trial
judge also is empowered to grant a protective order. This power is acknowledged by Oklahoma
Rule 3.8 which requires a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory material except "when the
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal." OsaLAomA
RuLEs oF PRoFEssIoNAl CONDUCT Rule 3.8(d) (1988).
216. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1169.
217. Id.
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indeed has the "inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, ' 218
thereby allowing it to fashion these new discovery procedures, it surely has
the power to require the prosecutor to make disclosures before the prelim-
inary hearing. 219
Moreover, there are sound policy reasons for requiring early disclosure
by the prosecutor. Because the prosecutor generally has most of the discovery
material in the file before charges are issued, there is no reason why such
material routinely cannot be provided to the defense soon after criminal
charges have been filed and before the preliminary hearing. This may
encourage the early resolution of some cases and the elimination of some
time-consuming preliminary hearings. The preliminary hearings that are held
should be more efficient as defense counsel will not have to spend time
simply learning basic facts. Court time and judicial resources will be saved
because many law enforcement officers, technicians, and other witnesses
will no longer be needed.-
Finally, it is difficult to see how the state's interests are served if defense
counsel is not prepared adequately for the preliminary hearing. If the state's
evidence is so weak that it cannot overcome an adequately prepared defense
lawyer, no interest is served by allowing the case to linger on and further
clog an already overburdened system. The marginal inconvenience to the
prosecution of providing discovery before the preliminary hearing and the
occasional delay caused because defense counsel wants additional time to
prepare for a hearing are greatly outweighed by the overall systemic benefits
obtained.
111. After Allen: The Legislative Task Ahead
What, then, should be the pre-trial procedures governing criminal discov-
ery in Oklahoma? Before describing the features of the discovery code which
the Oklahoma legislature should adopt, it is necessary to identify the goals
that a new system will be designed to achieve. The ABA Standards set forth
an excellent summary of the objectives of a fair, efficient discovery system?'2
That system should be designed to:
(i) promote an expeditious as well as a fair disposition of the
charges, whether by diversion, plea, or trial;
(ii) provide the accused with sufficient information to make an
informed plea;
218. Id. at 1167 (citing Inverarity v. Zumwalt, 97 Okla. Crim. 294, 262 P.2d 725, 730
(1953)).
219. It is impractical, unnecessary, and constitutionally suspect to require a defendant to
disclose any information before the preliminary hearing. Because discovery need not, nor
should not, be symmetrical, the lack of a defense obligation before the preliminary hearing
does not resolve the question of whether the prosecution should be so obligated.
220. David Lee raises timilar arguments in his article calling for defense access to investigative
reports. Lee, supra note 11, at 460-61.
221. See ABA STmi;DPRws 11-1.1 & commentary.
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(iii) permit thorough preparation for trial and minimize surprise
at trial;
(iv) reduce interruptions and complications during trial and avoid
unnecessary and repetitious trials by identifying and resolving
prior to trial any procedural, collateral, or constitutional issues;
(v) eliminate as nuch as possible the procedural and substantive
inequities among similarly situated defendants; and
(vi) effect economies in time, money, judicial resources, and
professional skills by minimizing paperwork, avoiding repetitious
assertions of issues, and reducing the number of separate hear-
ings.2n
With these goals in mind, procedures must be developed which will allow
for increased discovery in criminal cases consistent with the special protec-
tions afforded criminal defendants in the adversary system of criminal
justice. As discussed in the preceding section, this means the prosecution
should be required to disclose substantially more information than the
defense. There is nothing unfair about an open file policy for the prose-
cution; many prosecutors already follow such a policy. Obligating the
prosecutor to maintain an open file policy undoubtedly serves the best
interests of the criminal justice system because such a policy increases the
likelihood that the goals identified above will be attained.m No legitimate
interest is served when the prosecution holds back information from the
defense simply to improve the prosecutor's chances of winning at trial. It
is the task of the prosecutor to do justice, not merely secure convictions.?2
Although expanded defense discovery will improve the fair operation of
the system without any significant cost, the same claim cannot be made for
expanding prosecutorial discovery. Obtaining such discovery may improve
the prosecutor's ability to cross-examine defense witnesses, thereby exposing
false defenses. There is no evidence to suggest, however, that the use of
false defenses is a serious systemic problem. Any marginal gain to the
prosecution by obtaining such discovery is far outweighed by the potential
negative impact on the quality of representation provided criminal defen-
dants. Compelling defense counsel to disclose names of witnesses, provide
statements, and identify evidence prior to trial all serve to weaken the
attorney-client relationship, the defendant's constitutional rights, and the
adversary system. "In short, while the goal of full presentation of all the
facts is laudable, it cannot be satisfied at the expense of the defendant's
constitutional rights."n6
222. ABA STANDARDS 11-1.1.
223. See also supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
225. The alibi and mental capacity defense pose special problems for the state so that
disclosure of the nature of the defense is appropriate. See supra notes 140, 168-69 and
accompanying text.
226. In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 553, 698 P.2d 637, 643, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 575 (1985).
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Nonetheless, limited defense disclosures, particularly of expert reports,
are warranted. Affording the prosecutor pre-trial access to expert material
the defense intends to utilize at trial will generally enhance the accurate
presentation of expert testimony without infringing upon the defendant's
constitutional rights or compromising the attorney-client relationship. More-
over, the system must be designed to enable the prosecutor to withhold
information when special circumstances warrant. Hence, the proposed code
must allow for protective orders in appropriate cases.
The open file approach, therefore, is the key feature if the new discovery
code is to enhance the quality of justice meted out by the criminal justice
system. Three major problems burden the criminal justice system nationally,
problems which also plague Oklahoma: the number and complexity of pre-
trial issues, inexperienced defense lawyers, and the volume of post-conviction
litigation.? 7 The opem file policy routinely will provide defense counsel more
information. Access to such discovery will not be so dependent on defense
counsel's skill, experience, or relationship with the prosecutor. Armed with
more information, defense counsel will be better able to negotiate an
informed plea for the defendant or mount an adequate defense. More
discovery will also allow constitutional issues, such as the admissibility of
a statement or a pre-trial identification, to be identified and, if necessary,
litigated before trial. The goal, of course, is to eliminate defense counsel's
untimely identification of issues which result in the trial's disruption and a
host of unduly complicated post-conviction motions and hearings.
It is particularly important to structure the discovery system so that the
prosecution is encouraged to provide discovery material to the defense as
soon as possible. As discussed earlier, the systemic benefits of mandating
prosecutorial disclosures before the preliminary hearing are substantial.?2
Even in misdemeanor cases, the sooner discovery is provided to the defense,
the quicker most cases can be resolved. The vast majority of criminal cases
are, of course, resolved by means of a negotiated plea.229 Providing defense
counsel with early discovery will lessen, at least to some extent, uncertainties
about the state's case so that counsel and client can more meaningfully
discuss plea negotiations. Not only does early full discovery facilitate in-
formed plea bargaining, it may also improve the defendant's perception of
the fairness of the process. Additionally, more informed pleas may reduce
post-conviction claims, especially those involving ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The following proposed code, therefore, is structured to maximize the
flow of discovery material to the defense so as to promote the systematic
goals just discussed. It borrows heavily from the ABA Standards and in
part from Allen.
227. See ABA STmADtRDs 11-8; FiNAL REPORT OF THE SPANOENBERO GROUP ON OKLAHOMA
INDIGENT DEFENSE (1988).
228. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
229. Clennon, supra note 84, at 668.
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Section 2000: Short Title, Applicability and Purpose
Sections 2000 through 2014 of this title shall be known and may be cited
as the Oklahoma Criminal Discovery Code; This code shall govern the
procedures for all criminal cases in all courts in the state.20 The provisions
of this code shall be interpreted so as to promote the fair, expeditious
processing of criminal cases by facilitating the exchange of information and
material within an adversary framework protecting the constitutional rights
of all defendants.
Section 2001: Prosecutorial Disclosures2'
1. Upon the request of the defense, the prosecuting attorney shall
disclose to defense counsel all of the material and information
within the prosecutor's possession or control including but not
limited to:
(a) the names and addresses of witnesses, together with their
relevant oral, written or recorded statement, or summaries of
same;
(b) any written or recorded statements and the substance of
any oral statements made by the accused or made by a codefen-
dant;
(c) the name and address of any expert witness expected to be
called, together with a statement of the subject matter on which
the expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and a summary
of the grounds for each opinion, including the identity of any
other experts upon whom the trial expert expects to rely. In
addition, any reports or statements made by experts in connection
with the particular case, including results of physical or mental
examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons,
shall be disclosed; z2
230. Fairness dictates that the prosecutor provide full and open discovery in misdemeanor
cases. Because the defense rarely has adequate resources to conduct a thorough investigation
and the defendant has no right to a preliminary hearing, counsel defending a misdemeanor
charge has only a limited ability to assess the strength of the state's case without adequate
discovery. Unrepresented clients or those defendants with limited funds are especially disad-
vantaged by a system without easy access to the prosecution's case. Because the vast majority
of misdemeanor cases settle, most such cases can be handled routinely by simply providing
the defense with police or investigative reports which set out the bulk of the state's case.
Protective orders can be obtained in the exceptional case. The majority of the cases still will
settle, but the pleas will be more informed at little cost to the state. See also Clennon, supra
note 84, at 667-74 (arguing that broader discovery will enhance fairness and the efficiency of
the system without adversely effecting the number of guilty pleas or the rate of successful
prosecutions).
231. Except as noted, these procedures track Allen and ABA STANDAnS 11-2.1.
232. This modification of both Allen and ABA STANmARWS 11-2.1 is designed to meet several
problems identified in Eads, Adjudication by Ambush: Federal Prosecutors Use of Nonscientific
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(d) any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible ob-
jects, building;, or places which the prosecuting attorney intends
to use in tihe hearing or trial or which were obtained from or
belong to the accused;
(e) any record of prior criminal convictions of the defendant,
or of any codefendant;
(f) OSBI or FBI rap sheet/records check on any witness listed
by the state or the defense as a possible witness who will testify
at trial; and
(g) any investigative report generated by a law enforcement
agency in connection with the investigation of the crime with
which the accused is charged or a related charge if material
within that report is relevant to the charge pending against the
defendant. If the prosecutor does not wish to disclose a particular
report because it contains confidential or highly sensitive material,
the prosecutor must seek a protective order under Section 2012
of this code.Yz
2. When the information is within the prosecutor's possession or
control, the prosecuting attorney shall inform defense counsel:2 4
(a) if relevant recorded grand jury testimony has not been
transcribed;
(b) if the defendant's conversations or premises have been
subjected to electronic surveillance (including wiretapping);
Experts in a System of Limited Criminal Discovery, 67 N.C.L. REv. 577 (1989). First, the
present Allen provision enables prosecutors to avoid having to identify any expert where no
report or statement was prepared thereby allowing the defense to be "ambushed" by an expert
counsel is unprepared to cross-examine. Second, some reports are so brief that defense counsel
is left without a meaningful opportunity to prepare to cross-examine the expert. Obviously,
such inadequate reports frustrate the very purpose of requiring pre-trial disclosure. As Professor
Eads demonstrates, there are no sound policy arguments for not requiring the disclosure of
expert evidence. Id. at 623-25. Rather, as the court noted in Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255,
1263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990), "justice is certainly better served when a defendant is provided
with the most detailed information possible." This modification differs from that proposed
by Professor Eads iii that it does not include a provision allowing the court to permit
depositions. Arguably in an ideal system, the discretionary use of depositions would be
desirable. In the present woefully underfunded criminal justice system, there is not enough
money to adequately compensate defense lawyers, hire experts or pay for investigative services.
Depositions are a luxury the criminal justice system in Oklahoma simply cannot afford. Finally,
if society is unable or unwilling to provide indigent defendants ready and equal access to this
discovery tool, the tool should not be available only to wealthy defendants and the state.
233. This provision is added so as to avoid any possible confusion about the status of
investigative reports. See supra notes 14, 43, 88. All investigative reports are to be disclosed
subject to the prosecutor's right to seek a protective order. The onus is squarely on the
prosecutor to seek that protective order. Finally, it sets up a specific procedure to be followed
in the event the prosecutor feels that a particular report should not be disclosed.
234. This provision is taken from ABA STnANAns 11-2.1(b). It is included to encourage
the resolution of certain issues before trial by ensuring that defense counsel has clear notice
of potential issues. The aim again is to avoid mid-trial or post-trial litigation of complex issues
often with constitutional implications. See ABA STANDARDs 11-25 to 11-27.
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(c) if the prosecutor intends to conduct scientific tests, exper-
iments, or comparisons which may consume or destroy the subject
of the test, or intends to dispose of relevant physical objects;
and
(d) if the prosecutor intends to offer (as part of the proof that
the defendant committed the offense charged) evidence of other
crimes.235
3. At the earliest feasible opportunity,2 6 the prosecutor shall
disclose to defense counsel any material or information within
the prosecutor's possession or control which tends to negate the
guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or which would
tend to reduce the punishment of the accused. If a prosecutor is
uncertain whether certain material or information falls within the
scope of this provision, the prosecutor shall either disclose the
material or seek a protective order.237
4. The prosecuting attorney's obligations under this standard
extend to material and information in the possession or control
of members of the prosecutor's staff and of any others who have
participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and
who either regularly report or, with reference to the particular
case, have reported to the prosecutor's office. 28
5. If the defendant is unrepresented, the prosecutor shall inform
the accused of the right to obtain discovery by making a simple
request. Upon that request, discovery shall then be provided in
accordance with this code.2 9
235. While Burks already requires such notice to the defense, see supra note 38 and
accompanying text, the provision is included to provide clear notice to inexperienced defense
lawyers and prosecutors.
236. This provision modifies Allen and ABA STANDARDs 11-2.1 (c) by including the "earliest
feasible opportunity language." That language was borrowed from ABA STANDARDs 3-3.11
and is included to encourage prompt disclosure.
237. This sentence is added to make it clear to prosecutors that disclosure of even ques-
tionable exculpatory material is desirable. Given the large number of appellate cases in
Oklahoma and across the country in which claims are raised regarding exculpatory evidence,
a clear mandate is needed if the system indeed is going to minimize needless litigation and
expedite the fair disposition of cases. Again, no policy is served by not requiring the material
to be turned over since the prosecutor can seek a protective order if disclosure presents a
specific problem.
238. This provision follows ABA STANDARDS 11-2.1(d) instead of the Allen modification
because it more clearly defines the scope of the prosecutor's obligation. See supra notes 96-
97 and accompanying text. Together with provision 3 of § 2002, this provision is structured
to make it the specific responsibility of the prosecutor to ensure that the various investigative
agencies working on a case provide the prosecution any exculpatory evidence. It is up to the
prosecutor to make sure that the police are not withholding exculpatory information from the
prosecutor's office for that police practice violates a defendant's right to due process regardless
of the prosecutor's lack of knowledge of the information. James v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d
985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988); Freeman v. Georgia, 599 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
239. Despite the sixth amendment right to counsel, many defendants appear in Oklahoma
'1991]
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Section 2002: Prosecutor's Performance of Disclosuresm4
1. The prosecuting attorney shall provide disclosure under Sec-
tions 2001 and 2003 of this code, prior to the preliminary hearing
in a felony case if so requested, and in other cases, as soon as
practicable following the defense request for disclosure but not
later than the date designated for the discovery motion hearing
set pursuant to Section 2014 of this code.
2. Disclosure may be accomplished in any manner mutually
agreeable to the prosecutor and the defense, or the prosecutor
may:
(a) notify the defense that material and information, described
in general terms, may be inspected, obtained, tested, copied, or
photographed during specified reasonable times; and
(b) make available to the defense at the time specified such
material and information and suitable facilities or other arrange-
ments for inspection, testing, copying, and photographing of such
material and information.
3. The prosecutor shall ensure that:
(a) a flow of information is maintained between the various
investigative personnel and the prosecutor's office sufficient to
place within the prosecutor's possession or control all material
and information relevant to the accused and the offense charged;241
(b) a defendant's indigency does not restrict access to discov-
erable material. 242
Section 2003: Additional Disclosures Upon Specific Request243
Upon the request of defense counsel, the prosecuting attorney
shall disclose and permit inspection, testing, copying, and pho-
courts without a lawyer. Access to discovery should not turn on whether a defendant is
represented by counsel. Because a simple request will trigger discovery, the prosecutor should
be obligated to inform the defendant of this fact. Alternatively, the trial judge could inform
the defendant at the initial appearance of the right to discovery. This uses valuable court time,
however, and is not the best way to communicate with the unrepresented defendant, many of
whom are bewildered by what goes on in a courtroom. An easier solution is to have the
prosecutor give the unrepresented defendant at the initial appearance a slip briefly describing
how to obtain discovery,
240. This provision is substantially similar to ABA STANDARDS 11-2.2.
241. "It is incumbent upon the prosecutor to promulgate and enforce rigorous and systematic
procedures designed to preserve all discoverable evidence gathered in the course of a criminal
investigation." People v. District Court, 793 P.2d 163, 167 (Colo. 1990). See also State v.
Wisniewski, 103 N.M. 4:10, 708 P.2d 1031 (N.M. 1985); supra note 238.
242. This clause is added to ensure that copying charges are not utilized to prevent an
indigent defendant from gaining access to discoverable material. If a prosecutor's office is
going to impose copying charges, such charges must be reasonable. Yet for many indigent
defendants even minimal copying charges are too much. The prosecutor must provide the
indigent defendant materials without cost or make them readily available for inspection.
243. This provision tracks ABA STANDARDS 11-2.3. The disclosure of this information will
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tographing of any relevant material and information regarding:
(a) searches and seizures specified by the defense;
(b) the acquisition of specified statements from the accused;
(c) lineups, showups, picture or voice identification of the
accused, and any other procedures described in Section 2007 of
this code; and
(d) the relationship, if any, of specified persons to the prose-
cuting authority.
Section 2004: Material Held by Other Government PersonneP44
Upon defense counsel's request for, and designation of, material
or information which would be discoverable if in the possession
or control of the prosecuting attorney and which is in the pos-
session or control of other governmental personnel, the prose-
cuting attorney shall use diligent good faith efforts to cause such
material to be made available to defense counsel. If the prose-
cuting attorney's efforts are unsuccessful and such material or
other governmental personnel are subject to the jurisdiction of
the court, the court shall issue suitable subpoenas or orders to
cause such material to be made available to defense counsel.
Section 2005: Discretionary Disclosures45
Upon showing that an additional item is material to the prepa-
ration of the defense, the court may order disclosure to defense
counsel of the specified material or information.
facilitate the timely resolution of suppression motions, an important systemic goal identified
in ABA STANDARDS 11-1.1. See also ABA STANDARDS 11-33.
244. The investigative shortcomings of most defendants together with limited subpoena power
frequently leave the defense without access to information in the hands of other government
agencies. This provision follows ABA STANDAws 11-2.4. It provides clear authority to the
trial judge to order the disclosure of information, where appropriate, even though another
statute declares that certain records be kept confidential. Accordingly, such a provision gives
the trial court the express authority to issue an order to inspect records of the Department of
Human Services despite the fact that another statutory provision limits access to those records.
See State ex rel. Suttle v. District Court, 795 P.2d 523 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that
trial court lacked authority to permit defense inspection of Human Services records except for
in camera review by trial judge for exculpatory evidence). This provision also addresses the
concerns expressed by Judge Lane in Amos v. District Court, 814 P.2d 502 (Okla. Crim. App.
1991) (arguing that except for Brady material OSBI reports are confidential and not discoverable
absent explicit statutory authority). Moreover, by specifying a procedure to be followed,
guidance is provided so that cases such as Zeigler v. State can be eliminated. Zeigler v. State,
610 P.2d 251 (Okla. 1980). In Zeigler, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to obtain
sperm slides suggesting instead that the defense subpoena the doctor who examined the slides.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal recognized, however, that the defendant's subpoena
power was limited and the court erred in denying defendant's motion. Id. at 256. This code
is designed to ensure that a defendant like Zeigler is afforded easy access to material either
through § 2004 or, if necessary, through § 2005.
245. This is a modified version of ABA STANDARDs 11-2.5. It is included to make it clear
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Section 2006: Matters Not Subject to Prosecutorial Disclosure246
1. Disclosure hall not be required of legal research or records,
correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they
contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting
attorney or members of the prosecutor's legal staff.
2. Disclosure of an informant's identity shall not be required
where such identity is a prosecution secret and where a failure
to disclose will not infringe the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused. Disclosure shall not be denied of the identity of witnesses
to be produced at a hearing or trial.
Section 2007: Disclosures by the Accused27
1. After the initiation of judicial proceedings, the defendant must,
upon the prosecutor's request, appear within five (5) business
days, or within such other time as is mutually convenient for the
purpose of permitting the prosecution to obtain fingerprints,
photographs, handwriting exemplars, or voice exemplars from
the accused. Whenever the personal appearance of the accused
is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the
time and place of such appearance shall be given by the prose-
cuting attorney to the accused and accused's counsel. Provision
may be made for appearances for such purposes in an order
admitting the accused to bail or providing for the accused's
release.
2. Notwithstanding the initiation of judicial proceedings and after
appropriate notice to the defendant, a judge may order the
accused to participate in a procedure enumerated in paragraph
three for the purpose of disclosing nontestimonial evidence, if
the judge finds:
(a) there is good cause to believe that the evidence sought may
be relevant and material to the determination of whether the
defendant committed an offense charged in the accusatory in-
strument;
(b) the procedure is reasonable and will be conducted in a
that the court has the power to order such disclosures subject, of course, to the prosecutor's
right to argue for an appropriate protective order.
246. This section is identical to ABA STANDARDS 11-2.6 except that it drops subsection (c)
of that standard relating to national security. If an Oklahoma prosecutor has a claim involving
national security, the matter can be raised by way of a motion for a protective order.
247. This provision substantially tracks ABA STANDARDS 11.3.1. It allows the prosecutor to
obtain access to non-testimonial evidence after charges have been filed. While constitutional
questions may be appropriately raised in certain cases, these procedures generally provide a
fair, reasonable process for resolving issues of prosecutorial access. For a further discussion
of this provision, see ABA STANDARDS 11-43 to 11-50.
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manner which does not involve an unreasonable intrusion of the
body or an unreasonable affront to the dignity of the individual;
and
(c) the request is reasonable.
3. An order issued pursuant to paragraph two may direct the
accused to:
(a) appear, move, or speak for identification in a lineup, but
if a lineup is not practicable, then in some other reasonable
procedures;
(b) try on clothing or other articles;
(c) permit the taking of specimens of blood, urine, saliva,
breath, hair, nails, and material under the nails;
(d) permit the taking of samples of other materials of the body;
(e) submit to a reasonable physical or medical inspection,
including x-rays, of the body; or
(f) participate in other procedures which comply with the re-
quirements of paragraph two.
4. The request or order shall specify the following information
where appropriate: the authorized procedure, the scope of the
defendant's participation, the name or job title of the person
who is to conduct the procedure, and the time, duration, place,
and other conditions under which the procedure is to be con-
ducted.
Section 2008: Disclosure of Defense Expert Reports248
1. Any defendant who has requested and received discovery
pursuant to Sections 2001, 2003, 2004 or 2005 of this code shall,
upon the request of the prosecutor, disclose to the prosecutor,
and permit the prosecutor to inspect and copy or photograph,
any reports or statements, including results of physical or mental
examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons,
which were made by experts in connection with the particular
case and which the defense intends to use at a hearing or trial.
If the defense intends to call an expert who has not prepared a
statement or report, the prosecutor shall be provided a statement
of the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify,
the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each
opinion, including the identity of any other experts upon whom
the trial expert expects to rely.249
248. Section 2008 substantially follows ABA STANDARDS 11-3.2 with the inclusion of the
words "on rebuttal" to emphasize that the evidence should not be used in any way in the
state's case-in-chief. For a discussion of the reasons prosecutorial access must be carefully
limited, see supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
249. This provision is similar to that contained in § 2001. See supra note 232. The prosecutor,
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2. Disclosue shall not be required:
(a) of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or
memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, theories,
or conclusions of the defense attorney or members of the defense
legal staff; or
(b) of any communications of the defendant.
3. The fact that the defendant has indicated an intention to offer
specified evidence or to call a specified witness is not admissible
in evidence at a hearing or trial. Information obtained as a result
of disclosure pursuant to this standard is not admissible in evi-
dence at trial except on rebuttal to refute the matter disclosed.
Section 2009: Notice of Alibi and Mental Capacity Defense20
1. At least twenty (20) days before trial, the defendant shall
disclose to the prosecutor:
(a) a notice of intention to claim an alibi defense pursuant to
22 O.S. § 585; or
(b) an application raising the question of the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the offense pursuant to 22 O.S. § 1176.
2. The notice or application disclosed pursuant to paragraph one
is not admissible in evidence at a hearing or trial. Information
obtained as a result of disclosures made pursuant to paragraph
one is not admissible in evidence at trial except in rebuttal to
refute the defendant's defense.
Section 2010: Continuing Duty to DiscloseY'
If, after providing discovery pursuant to this code, a party dis-
covers additional material or information which is subject to
disclosure, the other party shall promptly be notified of the
existence of such additional material. If the additional material
or information is discovered during or after trial, the court shall
also be notified.
like defense counsel, needs the opportunity to prepare to meet expert testimony. If defense
counsel anticipates that pre-trial disclosures pose a legitimate risk of supplying incriminating
information to the prosecutor, counsel should seek a protective order.
250. Consistent with existing Oklahoma statutes, this provision only requires notice of the
two defenses generally recognized to pose unusual problems for the prosecution. See supra
notes 168-69 and accompanying text. As discussed earlier in the article, neither the Constitution
nor sound public policy is served by mandating additional disclosures. See supra notes 170-91
and accompanying text.
251. This language is virtually identical to that in ABA STANDARDS 11-4.2. Unlike Allen, it
applies to both sides. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. It is designed so that
neither party needs to make repeated requests. See ABA STANDARDS 11-58, 11-59.
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Section 2011: Custody of Materias 2
Any materials furnished to an attorney pursuant to this code
shall remain in that attorney's exclusive custody, shall be used
only for the purposes of conducting that attorney's case, and
shall be subject to such other terms and conditions as the court
may provide.
Section 2012: Protective Orders and In Camera ProceedingsP3
1. Upon a showing of cause, the court may at any time order
that specified disclosures be restricted, conditioned upon compli-
ance with protective measures, or deferred, or make such other
order as is appropriate, provided that all material and information
to which a party is entitled is disclosed in time to permit counsel
to make beneficial use of the disclosure.
2. Upon request of any person, the court may permit any showing
of cause for denial or regulation of disclosures, or any portion
of such showing, to be made in camera. A record shall be made
of both in court and in camera proceedings. Upon the entry of
an order granting relief following a showing in camera, the entire
record of the in camera portion of the showing shall be sealed,
preserved in the records of the court, and made available to the
appellate court in the event of an appeal.
Section 2013: Sanctions25
1. If a provision of this code or applicable court order is not
promptly implemented, the court may:
(a) order the noncomplying party to comply and provide the
material or information not previously disclosed;
(b) grant a continuance;
(c) exclude or limit testimony or evidence;
(d) dismiss the case; 255 or
252. This provision tracks ABA STANDARDS 11-4.3 It is included to minimize concerns about
the unnecessary dissemination of discovery materials.
253. This section combines ABA STANDARDS 11-4.4 and 11-4.6. It creates an ex parte
procedure which at times will be utilized to permit counsel to bring a discovery matter to the
court for resolution without "letting the cat out of the bag." See State ex rel. Carkulis v.
District Court, 229 Mont. 265, 746 P.2d 604, 615 (1987).
254. This provision borrows from ABA STANDARDs 11-4.7, Allen and Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 983 (1989). It is
designed to provide the court a range of possible sanctions to impose.
255. This remedy, like that of excluding defense witnesses, should be rarely used. See People
v. District Court, 793 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1990); ABA STANDARDs 11-67 to 11-68. If the prosecutor
has willfully or repeatedly violated discovery requirements, contempt or disciplinary proceedings
generally are more appropriate and more likely to be effective in encouraging future compliance.
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(e) grant a mistrial.
2. In determining the appropriate sanction to impose against the
defense, the court shall not prohibit the defendant from intro-
ducing evidence or witnesses material to the defense unless the
defendant willfully caused the discovery violation.? 6
3. Any person who willfully disobeys a provision of this code or
applicable court order may be subject to contempt or other
appropriate samctions.
Section 2014: General Discovery Procedurese-
1. At the initial appearance in a misdemeanor case and at the
arraignment following a bindover in a felony case, the judge
shall set a date for a discovery hearing. The time set shall be
sufficient to enable each side to complete unsupervised discovery
in accordance with this code.
2. Prior to the discovery hearing, both sides shall complete all
required disclosures and make a good faith effort to resolve any
discovery dispute. If a dispute cannot be resolved, a written
motion should be filed prior to the hearing identifying the ma-
terial sought with appropriate authority in support of the motion.
3. At the discovery hearing, the court shall:
But see Rosen, supra note 95 (demonstrating that disciplinary action at present is infrequently
used sanction and discussing need for disciplinary bodies to take more aggressive action to
curb prosecutorial misconduct).
256. In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), the Court imposed the "severest sanction"
of precluding several dfense witnesses from testifying because of the "willful and blatant"
misconduct of defense counsel in meeting his discovery obligation. Id. at 417. As Justice
Stevens noted in a footnote to his majority opinion, "the reasons for restricting the use of
the exclusion sanction to only the most extreme situations are even more compelling in the
case of criminal defendants, where due process requires that a defendant be permitted to offer
testimony of witnesses in his defense." Id. at 417 n.23. Given the constitutional implications
and severity of the exclusion sanction, the proposed provision adopts the reasoning of Justice
Brennan in his dissent in Taylor and expressly limits the sanction to those few cases where a
defendant's deliberate actions are responsible for the violation. Id. at 436 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). For a further discussion of the unfairness and costs of holding clients responsible
for their lawyers' sins, se Heiderscheitt, Taylor v. Illinois: The New and Not-So-New Approach
to Defense Witness Preclusion Sanctions for Criminal Discovery Violations, 23 GA. L. Rv.
479, 498-504 (1989). If the defense lawyer is responsible for a discovery problem, sanctions
against counsel are more appropriate and more likely to reduce violations.
257. This provision modifies the more formalized structure spelled out in ABA STANDARDS
11-5.2, 11-5.3, and 11-5.4. It is designed to encourage the resolution of all discovery matters
informally like in the civil system. The discovery hearing should be used to monitor compliance
and resolve disputes when necessary. In most instances, the hearing will be brief, and if the
court's calendar permits, may be used to take guilty pleas. The hearing should force both
sides to take a serious look at their case before the hearing and engage in more meaningful
plea negotiations sooner. If the case is not going to be settled, the hearing is useful to identify
problems and get them resolved in an orderly manner. Although a framework is provided, the
procedures are flexible enough to allow local jurisdictions to accommodate local practice.
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(a) determine if discovery is completed or if there are issues
which need to be resolved. An itemized list logging the discovery
material provided the other side shall be filed with the clerk at
the hearing. If additional preparation, evidence, or argument is
needed to reach a fair resolution of discovery issues, the hearing
shall be continued.
(b) determine if any suppression motions or other pre-trial
hearings need be set and if so, a date shall be set; and
(c) set a date for trial or for a pre-trial conference if one is to
be held.
IV. Conclusion
In Allen, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals created a criminal
discovery scheme granting both the defendant and the state pre-trial access
to certain materials with the goal of ensuring that the trial process indeed
seeks justice. Under the guise of evenhandedness, however, the Allen court
demands too much from the defense. Justice will not be attained by radically
altering the adversary system and diminishing the constitutional protections
afforded the criminal defendant. Justice demands that the fundamental
principles underlying our system be affirmed, not compromised. The Okla-
homa legislature must take a careful look at Allen and the goals of a fair,
constitutionally sound discovery system and then draft a new code which
promotes the fair and expeditious resolution of criminal cases in this state
without undermining the rights of the accused.
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